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THE CITY’S SECOND AMENDMENT 
Dave Fagundes† & Darrell A. H. Miller‡ 
Cities are increasingly common sites of contestation over 
the scope and meaning of the Second Amendment.  Some mu-
nicipalities have announced their opposition to firearm restric-
tions by declaring themselves Second Amendment 
sanctuaries.  Others have sought to curtail gun violence by 
passing restrictive local regulations.  Still others have re-
sponded to police violence by moving to demilitarize, disarm, 
or even disband their police forces.  The burgeoning post-Hel-
ler legal literature, though, has largely overlooked the relation-
ship between cities, collective arms bearing, and the Second 
Amendment.  In sum, to what extent do cities themselves have 
a right to keep and bear arms?  This Article tackles that ques-
tion.  The Article contests the proposition that cities are bereft 
of constitutional rights in general, or against their states in 
particular.  The Article challenges this notion by showing that 
the constitutional invisibility of municipal corporations is 
rooted in an outdated notion of the city as an artificial entity. 
The Article then turns to the Second Amendment, questioning 
the conventional wisdom that it provides solely a libertarian, 
individual bulwark against state restriction.  The Article 
shows that in fact the right to keep and bear arms has an 
important collective dimension that promotes safety, and that 
the city is historically and institutionally situated to advance 
this Second Amendment feature.  Finally, the Article examines 
how these two insights operate in practice, first by outlining 
the substantive contours of the city’s Second Amendment, and 
then by applying the model to contemporary controversies in 
firearm regulation such as guns in schools, concealed carry, 
Second Amendment sanctuaries, and the federal Law En-
forcement Officers Safety Act.  In addition to advancing the 
novel claim that cities themselves may assert rights to keep 
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and bear arms, the Article also adds to the growing literature 
on municipal constitutional rights and the institutional framing 
of the Second Amendment in a post-Heller world. 
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  678  
I. CITIES AS RIGHTS BEARERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  683  
A. Hunter and Cities as Artificial Entities . . . . . . . .  683  
B. Against Hunter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  690  
C. Toward a Common Law of Municipal
Personhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  701  
II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND THE CITY . . . . . . . . . . . . .  707  
A. The History, Purpose, and Nature of the
Second Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  710  
B. The City as a Self-Defense Institution . . . . . . . . .  720  
III. THE CITY’S SECOND AMENDMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  728  
A. The Substantive Contours of the City’s Second
Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  728  
1. Government Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  728  
2. The City as Collective Security Decision
Maker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  731  
3. Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  733  
B. The Theory in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  735  
1. Concealed Carry Licensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  735  
2. Police Officers Versus the City . . . . . . . . . . . . .  736  
3. Teachers with Guns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  737  
4. Second Amendment Sanctuaries . . . . . . . . . . .  740  
5. The Law Enforcement Officer Safety Act . . . .  742  
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  743  
INTRODUCTION 
Second Amendment cases and commentary alike focus al-
most exclusively on individual arms bearing.  Yet in an increas-
ing number of contemporary contexts, local governments have 
used legislation and policy statements to assert their own, in-
dependent interest in the right to keep and bear arms.  In New 
Hampshire, after the governor vetoed a statewide gun-free 
school bill, one local district banned all firearm possession in 
school buildings and on buses by anyone other than the po-
lice.1  In Seattle, Washington, city police officers sued the city, 
claiming it had infringed upon their Second Amendment rights 
to keep and bear (government-issued) arms by entering into a 
1 Rick Ganley & Mary McIntyre, N.H. School District Bans Guns from Build-
ings and Buses, NHPR (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.nhpr.org/post/nh-school-
district-bans-guns-buildings-and-buses#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/W54V-
7RN2]. 
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consent decree governing use of force.2  And amidst the racial 
reckoning sweeping America after the killing of George Floyd, 
some cities have considered (or reconsidered) demilitarizing, 
disarming, or disbanding their police.3
The implications of a city’s right to keep and bear arms do 
not always fall on the side of gun regulation.  Local govern-
ments, especially smaller towns and rural counties in blue 
states, may want to be more gun-friendly despite state restric-
tions.  Some school districts have sought to arm their teach-
ers.4  Some localities have declared themselves “Second 
Amendment sanctuaries” and passed resolutions vowing to re-
sist state laws they think curb gun rights.5  Some local govern-
2 Mahoney v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 873, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2017). 
3 See, e.g., Amy Forliti & Steve Karnowski, Minneapolis City Council Unani-
mously Approves Proposal to Disband Police, TIME (June 26, 2020, 12:02 PM) 
https://time.com/5860172/minneapolis-city-council-eliminate-police-george-
floyd/ [https://perma.cc/DUZ4-HE8T] (reporting that the Minneapolis City 
Council voted to allow dismantling of police force); see also Mélissa Godin, What 
the U.S. Can Learn from Countries Where Cops Don’t Carry Guns, TIME (June 19, 
2020, 6:18 AM), https://time.com/5854986/police-reform-defund-unarmed-
guns/ [https://perma.cc/ QX7Q-39WA] (same); Max Marcilla, Charlottesville City 
Council Passes Police Demilitarization Measure, Discusses Other Reforms, NBC 29 
(July 20, 2020, 10:38 PM) https://www.nbc29.com/2020/07/20/charlottesville-
city-council-passes-police-demilitarization-measure-discusses-other-reforms/ 
[https://perma.cc/K47L-Z4PL] (reporting that the Charlottesville City Council 
passed a resolution prohibiting the police department from receiving military 
weapons or training from the military); Minneapolis Mayoral Candidate Raymond 
Dehn Proposes Disarming Police of Guns, FOX 9 (July 25, 2017), http:// 
www.fox9.com/news/minneapolis-mayoral-candidate-raymond-dehn-proposes-
disarming-police-of-guns [https://perma.cc/6VPF-BRD8] (describing a mayoral 
candidate’s calls for disarming police).  For academic commentary on this point, 
see Anthony O’Rourke, Rick Su & Guyora Binder, Disbanding Police Agencies, 121 
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
4 See, e.g., Mead Gruver, Wyoming District Allows Armed Staff in Area Cited 
by DeVos, ASSOCIATED  PRESS (Apr. 18, 2018), https://apnews.com/cbdb18dd 
45994ad2b8175f47dbc50a32/Wyoming-district-allows-armed-staff-in-area-
cited-by-DeVos [https://perma.cc/XKK6-C52S] (reporting that the Park County 
School District voted to carry concealed guns in schools); Elizabeth Hernandez, At 
Least 30 Colorado School Districts and Charter Schools Allow Teachers to Carry 
Guns, but No Statewide Training Standards Regulate Them, DENVER POST (July 9, 
2018, 5:57 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/07/08/colorado-teacher-
guns-schools-classroom/ [https://perma.cc/LE44-W7R2] (“Based on Colorado 
law, school boards could designate teachers and staff as school security officers 
permitted to carry a concealed weapon on campus without ensuring training.”); 
Jason Thomson, Colorado School District to Equip Security Workers with Semiauto-
matic Rifles, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/ 
USA/2016/0419/Colorado-school-district-to-equip-security-workers-with-semi-
automatic-rifles [https://perma.cc/EA7G-J9TW] (“Teachers in Utah are free to 
arm themselves, and during the state’s October break from school, the Utah 
Shooting Sports Council offered free concealed weapons classes to 20 teachers.”). 
5 See, e.g., John M. Glionna, In Needles, A Sanctuary for Gun Owners—and 
‘a Little Jab in the Eyes’ for California, S.F. CHRON. (July 31, 2019, 4:36 PM), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/In-Needles-a-sanctuary-for-gun-
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ments have even toyed with the idea of deputizing private 
citizens in their jurisdiction.6
These local gun policies—whether expansive or restric-
tive—often run afoul of state law.  New York state law preempts 
local authority to arm teachers.7  Georgia legislation prevents 
city police from questioning armed individuals about their gun 
licenses.8  More than half of the states require municipalities to 
permit individuals to carry firearms within city limits, even 
when those individuals have little to no training on how to use 
them.9  Still other states prevent cities from banning personal 
owners-and-14271396.php [https://perma.cc/L333-9Y8L](stating that Needles, 
California declared itself a “Second Amendment Sanctuary City”); Jennifer Mas-
cia, Second Amendment Sanctuaries, Explained, TRACE (Jan 14, 2020), https:// 
www.thetrace.org/2020/01/second-amendment-sanctuary-movement/ [https:/ 
/perma.cc/MJ9F-5C4F] (“More than 400 municipalities in 20 states have now 
passed resolutions opposing the enforcement of certain gun laws passed by state 
or federal lawmakers.”); Kieran Nicholson, City Council in Commerce City Ap-
proves Resolution as Second Amendment Sanctuary City, DENVER POST (June 4, 
2019, 5:26 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/06/04/commerce-city-sec-
ond-amendment-sanctuary-city/ [https://perma.cc/VW5B-GBR6] (reporting 
that the Commerce City Council passed a resolution declaring itself a Second 
Amendment sanctuary city); Noah Shepardson, America’s Second Amendment 
Sanctuary Movement Is Alive and Well, REASON (Nov. 11, 2019, 4:00 PM), https:// 
reason.com/2019/11/21/americas-second-amendment-sanctuary-movement-
is-alive-and-well/ [https://perma.cc/G9WR-6FW7] (“[G]enerally, Second Amend-
ment sanctuaries refuse to dedicate resources to enforcing things like ‘red flag’ 
laws and bans on certain weapons.”).  For a sustained academic discussion of this 
topic, see generally Shawn E. Fields, Second Amendment Sanctuaries, 115 NW. U. 
L. REV. 437 (2020).
6 See Caleb Stewart, Virginia Sheriff Vows to Deputize Citizens If Gun Laws
Pass, WHSV (Dec. 9, 2019 2:18 PM), https://www.whsv.com/content/news/Vir-
ginia-sheriff-vows-to-deputize-citizens-if-gun-laws-pass-565981991.html 
[https://perma.cc/66DM-WEQK]; see also Christina Maxouris, A Florida Sheriff 
Said He Will Deputize Lawful Gun Owners If Protests Turn Violent, CNN (July 2, 
2020, 3:10 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/02/us/florida-sheriff-deputize-
gun-owners-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/GTJ2-KFSJ] (reporting that a 
Florida sheriff said he would deputize lawful gun owners if there were violent 
protests in his county). 
7 See, e.g., Michael Gold, Teachers Barred from Carrying Guns in New York 
Schools, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/31/ 
nyregion/guns-schools-ban-teachers-ny.html [https://perma.cc/VCX6-J3ZY] 
(reporting that New York passed a bill banning school districts from allowing 
teachers to carry guns in schools). 
8 See GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-11-137(b) (2020) (“A person carrying a weapon 
shall not be subject to detention for the sole purpose of investigating whether 
such person has a weapons carry license.”). 
9 Jennifer Mascia, 26 States Will Let You Carry a Concealed Gun Without 
Making Sure You Know How to Shoot One, TRACE (Apr. 17, 2017, 11:37 AM), 
https://www.thetrace.org/2016/02/live-fire-training-not-mandatory-concealed-
carry-permits/ [https://perma.cc/D92M-N7WS] (“Just 24 states and the District 
of Columbia include mandatory range time as part of their permitting process, 
while the remaining 26 have no such requirement in place.”). 
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firearms in government buildings, council meetings and even 
police stations.10
In each of these cases, the state preempts the local govern-
ment’s interest in its own, or its citizens’ collective, arms bear-
ing.  If these municipalities were private corporations, and the 
state government had dictated that the corporation arm or dis-
arm its agents, a court would need to address some threshold 
questions.  Does this corporate entity have constitutional 
rights?  Does the right to keep and bear arms extend to the 
corporate entity?11  What kind of burdens can be placed on 
them if so?  One of us has explored private corporate arms in a 
prior work.12  We now address the issue when the corporation 
is not private, but municipal. 
The city’s distinct role in setting weapons policy has been a 
feature of the law for over seven centuries.13  Still, disputes 
over arms bearing within the city are typically assessed along 
one dimension, with individual rights on one side of the ledger 
and a general police power on the other.  Cities often lose these 
fights, either because the city’s regulation runs afoul of federal 
or state rights to keep and bear arms, or, more often, because 
the state preempts the local law.  Either way, the city’s interest 
in arms bearing is typically considered incidental to its more 
general power to protect health and safety.  We challenge that 
conventional framing and address the city’s interest in its own 
10 See Location Restrictions, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/ 
gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/location-restrictions/#buildings [https:// 
perma.cc/LJ9C-V73S]; Amy B. Wang, Open-Carry Advocates Walked into a Police 
Station with a Loaded Rifle.  Officers Were Not Amused., WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2017, 
4:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/02/ 
07/open-carry-advocates-walked-into-a-police-station-with-a-loaded-rifle-of-
ficers-were-not-amused/ [https://perma.cc/RHC2-JECA]. 
11 In Second Amendment Arms v. City of Chicago, the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois assumed business corporations have Second 
Amendment rights.  135 F. Supp. 3d 743, 761 (N.D. Ill. 2015).  Judge Dow wrote, 
“Absent any clear or precedential guidance on the issue, the Court is persuaded 
by the longstanding line of cases recognizing the rights afforded to corporations in 
the First and Fourth Amendment contexts.  Based on that ever-growing body of 
law, it seems inevitable that the same principles will hold true in the Second 
Amendment context.” Id. But see Leo Combat, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 15-
cv-02323-NYW, 2016 WL 6436653, at *10 (D. Colo. Aug. 29, 2016) (“[A]ny rights
extended to a corporation under the Second Amendment are dependent upon the
entity’s ability to assert individual rights of third-parties on their behalf.”).
12 See generally Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, 
and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887 (2011). 
13 See 2 Edw. c. 3 § 320 (1328) (Eng.) (giving power to “Mayors and Bailiffs of 
Cities and Borough[s]” to stop people from carrying weapons in “Fairs [and] Mar-
kets, [or] in the presence of the Justices or other Ministers, [or] . . . elsewhere”); 
Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 84–85 (2013). 
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arms bearing.  More provocatively, we explore how a city can 
assert a constitutional right to keep and bear arms. 
Beyond its core claim that the city has Second Amendment 
rights, this Article contributes to the literature on municipali-
ties and public law in two ways.  First, it adds to the scholar-
ship on municipal constitutional rights.  Municipalities and 
local governments regularly participate in the legal system as 
both plaintiffs and defendants, but the law has not yet devel-
oped a coherent theory of their legal status.  Rather, local gov-
ernments fade in and out of doctrine depending on the 
rhetorical or institutional demands of the particular court in 
the particular case.  We use the Second Amendment rights of 
cities as a launching point to highlight the need for a coherent 
common law of municipal legal personality and to outline some 
options for what such a doctrine may look like.  Second, this 
Article contributes to post-District of Columbia v. Heller theo-
rizing about the Second Amendment by discussing the right to 
keep and bear arms within an institutional framework. Heller 
unsettled the one corporate body—the organized militia—that 
had structured the right to keep and bear arms for centuries. 
This Article advances a model of the city as a collective govern-
ance structure whose purpose is self-protection.  This purpose, 
in turn, provides institutional context for the city’s right to keep 
and bear arms in a post-Heller world. 
Part I situates municipalities as rights-bearing entities.  We 
challenge the conventional wisdom that municipalities can 
claim no constitutional rights, and certainly none against their 
states, because they are mere “arms” or “agents” of the state. 
This artificial entity theory of the city does not reflect the socio-
logical reality of the modern municipal corporation or com-
mand consistent treatment in constitutional adjudication. 
Part II approaches the question of the city’s right to keep and 
bear arms, not from the perspective of the entity, but from the 
perspective of the right.  It questions the commonly held notion 
that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for 
self-defense is solely personal.  It explores the nature of the 
right to keep and bear arms and shows that the right—before 
and after Heller—contemplates some kinds of collective behav-
ior.  This Part explains why it is necessary to re-frame the Sec-
ond Amendment’s core value as safety, not self-defense 
simpliciter, and relates that purpose to the historical role of the 
city as supplier of armed internal security.  It conceives the 
city’s function—perhaps its primary function—as an institu-
tion designed for public safety and collective self-preservation. 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-3\CRN303.txt unknown Seq: 7 25-MAR-21 9:56
683 2021] THE CITY’S SECOND AMENDMENT 
Part III turns to the practical implications of this approach, 
examining how modern controversies about firearm regulation 
would look if seen through the prism of the city’s Second 
Amendment. 
I 
CITIES AS RIGHTS BEARERS 
Courts and commentators alike regularly assert that mu-
nicipal governments can claim no constitutional rights against 
their states, including any rooted in the Second Amendment. 
Courts often unreflectively treat municipal corporations as 
mere agents of state government, to be created or discarded at 
the whim of the legislature, unless the state curbs its own 
power through legislation or state constitutional amendment. 
Certainly, if cities cannot assert any constitutional protections 
against their states, it would render the claim that they can 
invoke the right to keep and bear arms a non-starter.  In this 
Part, we challenge this long-accepted view of cities as constitu-
tional nonpersons.  We critique this notion by exploring the 
flawed foundations of modern jurisprudence about the consti-
tutional status of the municipal corporation as a rights bearer. 
This analysis shows that cities should play a central, rather 
than a peripheral, role in constitutional discourse, and invites 
further scholarly discussion about the legal personhood of mu-
nicipal entities. 
A. Hunter and Cities as Artificial Entities
The notion that municipalities have no rights against their 
states—conventionally called the Hunter doctrine (after the 
1907 Supreme Court case Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh14) is a 
familiar fixture of American public law.  In Hunter, the Court 
articulated a doctrine of plenary state power over municipal 
corporations: “The State . . . at its pleasure, may modify or 
withdraw all . . . powers [from the city], may take without com-
pensation [the city’s] property, hold it itself, or vest it in other 
agencies, expand or contract the [city’s] territorial area, unite 
the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the 
charter and destroy the corporation.”15  And, lest there be any 
doubt of the scope of this authority, Hunter decreed that all 
these acts could be done without conditions, no matter what 
the consequences, and heedless of the protest of the city, or 
14 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
15 Id. at 178–79. 
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any of its inhabitants.16  When it comes to municipal corpora-
tions “the State is supreme” and the federal Constitution is 
absent.17 
States regularly invoke Hunter to quash any claim a mu-
nicipal government may have against a state regulation. 
Courts tend to cite this principle reflexively, without question-
ing the doctrine’s descriptive accuracy or its legal justification. 
In this subpart, we do just that, and show that the Hunter 
doctrine relies on an outdated account of the role cities play in 
the scheme of government and the lives of their residents, both 
as a sociological matter and as a doctrinal one.  Once Hunter’s 
legal scaffolding falls away, the plausibility of a rights-bearing 
municipal corporation becomes apparent. 
The roots of the Hunter doctrine extend down to the Court’s 
earliest decisions on corporations.  Initially, courts did not dis-
tinguish between private and municipal corporations.18  The 
law regarded the two as more alike than different, and courts 
typically proceeded on the assumption that the same rules of 
law governed both.19  That basic notion tended to be extremely 
restrictive.  This approach, which modern scholars term the 
artificial entity theory, posited that all corporations were no 
more than creatures of the state, and owed their entire exis-
tence to the charters that created them.  According to Justice 
Marshall in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, a cor-
poration is an “artificial being, invisible, intangible, and ex-
isting only in contemplation of law. . . . [The corporation] 
possesses only those properties which the charter of its crea-
tion confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very 
16 Id. at 179. 
17 Id. 
18 HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730–1870, at 185 (1983).  The distinction 
that concerned courts in the early American republic was between chartered 
entities (cities and corporations) and unincorporated ones (towns and counties). 
Josh Bendor, Municipal Constitutional Rights: A New Approach, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 389, 399 (2013). 
19 See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 
1095 (1980) (“Since the important English cities were corporations indistinguish-
able as a legal matter from any other commercial corporation, English law natu-
rally treated the question of the power of cities as being synonymous with that of 
the power of corporations.”).  That is not to say that courts and scholars were not 
aware of the formal differences between different corporations, only that they did 
not regard them as having the same implications that they have today.  James 
Kent, for example, articulated in his early treatise on American law a number of 
distinctions between different kinds of corporations: lay and ecclesiastical; elee-
mosynary and civil; and public and private.  2 JAMES  KENT, COMMENTARIES ON 
AMERICAN LAW 221–22 (1827). 
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existence.”20  So conceived, a corporation had no cognizable 
legal status, and certainly no rights, other than what its char-
ter explicitly granted. 
The artificial entity theory regarded all corporations as 
“creatures of sovereign dispensation.”21  States extended the 
privilege of a charter only in exchange for some social benefit. 
Typically, they required corporations to undertake some pub-
lic-regarding service or maintain some kind of common re-
source.22  For chartered cities, the public purpose was plain 
enough: the state used the municipality to order its internal 
affairs.  The artificial entity theory for all corporations, munici-
pal and private, presumed a quid pro quo: Because corpora-
tions existed at the pleasure of the state, the state could impose 
conditions on, exact demands of, and reserve power from 
them.23 
The legal status of private and public corporations began to 
diverge early in the nineteenth century.  In Terrett v. Taylor,24 
the Supreme Court affirmed that even though private corpora-
tions were artificial entities, states could not divest them of 
property “without the consent or default of the corporators.”25 
The Court stressed, though, that these same protections did 
not extend to municipal corporations.  Rather, state legisla-
tures remained free to “change, modify, enlarge or restrain” 
such public corporations, so long as they did not interfere with 
any individual’s private property.26 
In Dartmouth College, the Court went a step further. 
Dartmouth College considered whether the Contracts Clause 
barred the state of New Hampshire from reorganizing a 
chartered corporation, Dartmouth College, and transferring its 
property to a newly formed board of trustees.27  The Court up-
held the challenge to the state’s action, and central to its hold-
ing was its conclusion that the College had been chartered as a 
private, not a public institution.  The Contracts Clause, the 
Court held, restrained state legislatures from impairing “con-
tracts respecting property, under which some individual could 
20 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). 
21 Miller, supra note 12, at 916. 
22 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 132 (3d ed. 2005). 
23 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 708 (Story, J., concurring) (discussing 
ability of the state to reserve corporations’ power to contract through chartering); 
see Larry Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. J. 183, 209 (2004). 
24 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815). 
25 Id. at 52. 
26 Id. 
27 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 628–30. 
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claim a right to something beneficial to himself.”28  However, 
the Clause “did not intend to restrain the States in the regula-
tion of their civil institutions, adopted for internal govern-
ment.”29  The Court did not limit its holding to the Contracts 
Clause, though.  Rather, it stated that because municipalities 
are “employed in the administration of government . . . the 
legislature of the State may act according to its own judgment, 
unrestrained by any limitation of power imposed by the consti-
tution of the United States.”30 
The artificial entity theory in Terrett and Dartmouth College 
burdened all corporations but weighed most heavily on munici-
pal ones.  Private companies still enjoyed some limited freedom 
to organize their own affairs and to have their property consti-
tutionally protected from state interference.31  But municipali-
ties were artificial entities in a purer sense: They were solely 
creations of the state that could be limited and reorganized 
however the state deemed desirable to suit its ends.  For a 
century after these cases, local governments raised constitu-
tional challenges to state interference with local control—rang-
ing from taxation to boundary disputes to the elimination of 
entire cities—on the grounds that such moves violated vari-
ously the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, or the 
Takings Clause.  Courts invariably rejected these claims, in-
voking the constraints of the artificial entity theory outlined in 
Terrett, Dartmouth College and the like, and effectively making 
any state delegation of governance prerogatives revocable.32 
By 1868 the principle appeared so entrenched that Chief 
Justice John Dillon of the Supreme Court of Iowa in Merriam v. 
Moody’s Executors summarized the indisputable “settled law” 
of municipal corporations: 
[A] municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the fol-
lowing powers and no others: First, those granted in express 
words; second, those necessarily implied or necessarily inci-
28 Id. at 628. 
29 Id. at 629. 
30 Id. at 629–30.  Justice Bushrod Washington added in concurrence that 
because a corporation “is the mere creature of [a] public institution. . . . [it] may be 
controlled, and its constitution altered and amended by the government, in such 
manner as public interest may require.” Id. at 660–61 (Washington, J., 
concurring). 
31 Frug identifies the split between city powerlessness and constitutional pro-
tection for private corporations as the result of an ideological choice, not one 
driven by any real notion of different capacities between the two. See Frug, supra 
note 19, at 1073. 
32 See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (compiling 
cases). 
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dent to the powers expressly granted; third, those absolutely 
essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corpora-
tion—not simply convenient, but indispensable; fourth, any 
fair doubt as to the existence of a power is resolved by the 
courts against the corporation—against the existence of the 
power.33 
Dillon’s Rule, as it came to be called, represented the dominant 
view of municipal corporations throughout the latter nine-
teenth and early twentieth century, and still anchors disputes 
about municipal power today.34 
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh represents the logical extension 
of Terrett, Dartmouth College, and Dillon’s Rule.  In Hunter, the 
Court considered whether residents of the City of Allegheny 
could raise a constitutional challenge to the state’s decision to 
merge their municipality with neighboring Pittsburgh.35  Penn-
sylvania had enacted a plan in which a majority of all votes of 
the citizens of both Pittsburgh and Allegheny would determine 
whether the cities would consolidate.  Unsurprisingly, Alle-
gheny, the smaller municipality, lost the combined vote despite 
a majority of its citizens rejecting the consolidation.  The re-
sidents alleged the merger violated the Contracts Clause and 
took their property without due process of law.  The Court re-
jected their claims: “Municipal corporations are political subdi-
visions of the State, created as convenient agencies for 
exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may 
be entrusted to them,”36 Justice William Moody wrote for the 
majority.  With respect to any power a municipality has or any 
property it may hold “the State is supreme, and its legislative 
body . . . may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the 
Constitution of the United States.”37 
Hunter represents the Court’s most extensive articulation 
of the artificial entity theory of municipal corporations, rooted 
in the notion that municipalities exist solely at states’ discre-
tion and for the sole purpose of effectuating state ends.  In this 
view, municipalities are not sociological or political phenomena 
as much as creatures of state administration.  The state exists 
33 Merriam v. Moody’s Ex’rs, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868). 
34 Dillon reiterated his concept of municipal corporations in an influential 
treatise.  1 JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55, at 173 (2d ed. 
1873).  For a rich historical and theoretical challenge to Dillon’s Rule through the 
assembly clause, see generally Nikolas Bowie, The Constitutional Right of Self-
Government, 130 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
Papers.cfm?abstract_id=3676811 [https://perma.cc/A44F-9FLY]. 
35 Hunter, 207 U.S. at 177. 
36 Id. at 178. 
37 Id. at 179. 
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prior to law, but the city does not.38 Hunter’s framing of the 
city in this way then justified the Court’s holding in two ways. 
One rationale was a simple greater-includes-the-lesser notion: 
If states could create and dissolve local entities at will, then it 
would be incoherent to regard those entities as having any 
capacity to assert constitutional rights against those states.39 
The other was that if the sole purpose of local governments is to 
facilitate the work of state governments, allowing municipali-
ties to interpose federal constitutional guarantees would frus-
trate rather than further their core function.40  Hence, states 
were free to do anything they wanted to do to local govern-
ments, “conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the 
consent of citizens, or even against their protest.”41  Finally, the 
Court put an exclamation point on this holding, encouraging 
the lower federal courts to apply this rule “wherever . . . 
applicable.”42 
Hunter established a broad “federal rule of local powerless-
ness.”43  The artificial entity theory of the municipal corpora-
tion it endorses persists today.44  For example, courts have 
denied municipal corporations equal protection on Hunter 
grounds.45  They have denied privileges and immunities rights 
for similar reasons.46  Other courts have denied municipalities 
38 Cf. Daniel Weinstock, Cities and Federalism, in 55 NOMOS: FEDERALISM & 
SUBSIDIARITY 259, 267 (James. E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014) (discussing 
way in which nations are assumed to be prepolitical, while cities are legally 
constructed). 
39 Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178 (“The number, nature, and duration of the powers 
conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be 
exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State.”). 
40 Cf. id. at 178 (noting that municipal corporations are “convenient agencies” 
for exercising “governmental powers of the State”). 
41 Id. at 179. 
42 Id. at 178. 
43 Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 
HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 1, 15 (2012). 
44 See, e.g., Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (noting a state 
may “may withdraw any part of that [power] which has been delegated”); 2 EUGENE 
MCQUILLIN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4:3 (3d ed.) (“Legisla-
tive authority over municipal corporations and their civil, political and govern-
mental powers exists, except as limited by the federal and state constitutions, and 
such legislative power is often referred to as plenary, supreme, absolute, com-
plete, or unlimited.”). 
45 E.g., Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196 (1923) (“The City cannot 
invoke the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against the State.”); S. Ma-
comb Disposal Auth. v. Twp. of Wash., 790 F.2d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[A] 
political subdivision of a state cannot challenge the constitutionality of another 
political subdivision’s ordinance on due process and equal protection grounds.”). 
46 City of Marshfield v. Towns of Cameron, 127 N.W. 2d 809, 813 (Wis. 1964) 
(“It is also well established that municipalities may not invoke privileges and 
immunities under the federal constitution in opposition to the will of the state.”). 
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First Amendment rights.47  Occasionally the Hunter-like pro-
nouncements have been broad and categorical, asserting a city 
is bereft of any federal constitutional right against its state.48 
As recently as 2009, the Supreme Court invoked the 
Hunter principle as a major premise of its holding in Ysursa v. 
Pocatello Education Ass’n.49  In Ysursa, the plaintiffs argued 
that Idaho’s ban on payroll deductions for “political activities” 
was invalid as applied to local governments because the state 
was preventing municipalities and their employees from engag-
ing in constitutionally protected speech.  The Court, which had 
already held the restriction valid as applied to state govern-
ments, rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish local gov-
ernments, using the same artificial entity reasoning that the 
Court did through the 1800s.  “Political subdivisions of States,” 
it held, are “subordinate governmental instrumentalities cre-
ated by the State to assist in the carrying out of state govern-
mental functions.”50 And because municipalities are “merely” 
subdivisions of the state, “the State may withhold, grant or 
withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit.”51 
Courts’ casual invocations of this framework to diminish 
municipal corporations stands in marked contrast to their 
evolving treatment of private corporations.52  The private cor-
poration underwent massive changes over the course of the 
nineteenth century.  General incorporation statutes made for-
mation much easier.  Mergers and combinations resulted in a 
47 In Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1038 n.12 (For-
mer 5th Cir. 1982) the court stated that “Government expression, being unpro-
tected by the First Amendment, may be subject to legislative limitation which 
would be impermissible if sought to be applied to private expression.”  But it 
hastened to add, “[T]here is nothing to suggest that, absent such limitation, 
government is restrained from speaking any more than are the citizens.” Id. 
48 See, e.g., Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) (“A munic-
ipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no 
privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may invoke in 
opposition to the will of its creator.”); City of San Juan Capistrano v. Cal. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n, 937 F.3d 1278, 1280 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e have consistently held 
that political subdivisions lack standing to challenge state law on constitutional 
grounds in federal court.”). 
49 555 U.S. 353 (2009). 
50 Id. at 362 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964)). 
51 Id. at 362 (quoting Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923)). 
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, observing that the blanket citation to the 
Hunter doctrine ignores that “[r]elationships between state and local governments 
are more varied, and the consequences of that variation are more significant, than 
the majority’s analysis admits.” Id. at 375 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
52 For an entertaining and illuminating discussion, see generally ADAM WIN-
KLER, WE  THE  CORPORATIONS: HOW  AMERICAN  BUSINESSES  WON  THEIR  CIVIL  RIGHTS 
(2018). 
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few large entities dominating disproportionate shares of major 
industries, especially railroads.53  And, as the number of cor-
porations in America increased from approximately thirty-five 
in the 1790s to 270,000 by the first decade of the 1900s,54 law 
responded to the transformation—and omnipresence—of the 
private corporation by gradually theorizing about them differ-
ently than municipal corporations. 
Alternatives to the artificial entity theory—the aggregation 
and real entity theories—sought to match the changing social 
reality of the corporate form.55  Theorists of private corpora-
tions began to conceive of them, not as mere instruments of 
state government to better administer some public good, but as 
aggregations of individual constitutional rights holders; or, al-
ternatively, as sociological phenomena akin to families or 
schools, greater than the sum of their parts.56  This doctrinal 
and theoretical dynamism did not materially alter courts’ unre-
flective conception of municipalities’ legal status, though, 
which to this day remains tethered to Hunter.57 
B. Against Hunter 
Courts repeatedly echo the Hunter principle that cities lack 
any rights because they are mere government instruments to 
be created, limited, or destroyed as their states see fit.  To the 
extent the Hunter doctrine rests on an empirical proposition 
about cities—that their identity and function in our democracy 
is no more distinctive than the state bureau of motor vehicles— 
that is easily disproven.  The Hunter doctrine also fails to grasp 
the nuance in doctrine that has developed with respect to mu-
nicipal constitutional rights.  Notwithstanding Hunter, the con-
stitutional claims of municipal governments, even against their 
states, have been respected, albeit sub silentio.  Finally, Hunter 
cannot be justified normatively, as important constitutional 
values and essential aspects of our constitutional culture re-
53 See, e.g., SUSANNA KIM RIPKEN, CORPORATE PERSONHOOD 26 (2019); Morton J. 
Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. 
REV.173, 181, 190 (1985) (discussing “free incorporation”). 
54 Richard Sylla, How the American Corporation Evolved Over Two Centuries, 
158 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 354, 355 (2014). 
55 RIPKEN, supra note 53, at 29, 35. 
56 See, e.g., Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 
253, 257–62 (1911) (discussing conceptions of corporations). 
57 Richard C. Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade a City, 104 VA. L. 
REV. ONLINE 58, 67 (2018) (“Almost a generation ago, legal scholars Gerald Frug 
and Hendrik Hartog described how the municipal corporation lost its corporate 
privileges and became an arm of the state, while the private business corporation 
attained property and constitutional rights.”). 
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quire municipal participation and protection from state inter-
ference.  It is time to rethink the broad and unconsidered 
application of Hunter and recognize that municipalities can 
and should be able to assert some constitutional rights. 
At the time Dartmouth College was decided, it may have 
been plausible to treat the city as nothing more than a state 
functionary.58  But in the century after these cases were de-
cided, the role of local government in American political life has 
changed.  Demographic transformations mean that the na-
tion’s population has become larger and more urban, so that a 
greater and ever-increasing proportion of Americans call cities 
home and sometimes identify with their city as much or more 
than their state.59 
Hunter also rested on the premise that local governments 
exist solely to serve the ends of the states that created them. 
This notion of municipalities as mere instrumentalities of the 
state, too, fails to accurately describe the role of the modern 
American city, if it ever did.  Far from being agents of the state 
consigned to merely carrying out ministerial functions, con-
temporary cities exercise significant autonomy.  Some states 
have expressly abandoned Dillon’s Rule as a framework for 
municipal government power.60  Home rule movements of the 
1800s and early 1900s have wrested power away from state 
58 Even that though is a hotly contested proposition. See Frug, supra note 
19, at 1083 (“The medieval town was not an artificial entity separate from its 
inhabitants; it was a group of people seeking protection against outsiders for the 
interest of the group as a whole.”); Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal 
Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 395 (1985) 
(“After the Declaration of Independence, the Corporation of the City of New York 
lost no time in ensuring that its charter rights, which were originally granted by 
the English king, would continue to be protected from intrusions by its new 
sovereign.”). 
59 Cf. WENDY GRISWOLD, REGIONALISM AND THE READING CLASS 11–17 (2008) (“The 
people within a region are seen as having something in common.  This common 
ground, which is typically geographic, political, and/or economic, gives rise to 
shared forms of cultural expression.”); Victoria C. Plaut, Hazel Rose Markus, Jodi 
R. Treadway & Alyssa S. Fu, The Cultural Construction of Self and Well-Being: A 
Tale of Two Cities, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1644, 1645 (2012) 
(“[E]veryday life is organized by local ideas and practices and [this research] sug-
gest[s] that fulfilling the task of becoming an independent individual—and there-
fore self and well-being—will necessarily take regionally specific forms.”). 
60 E.g., Blanchard v. Berrios, 72 N.E.3d 309, 321 n.2 (Ill. 2016) (recognizing 
abandonment of Dillon’s rule); State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 
1980) (“The Dillon Rule of strict construction is antithetical to effective and effi-
cient local and state government.”); see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part 
I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1990) (stating 
“[Dillon’s] Rule has been formally abandoned by many states”). 
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authorities and reposed it in local subdivisions.61  Today, forty 
states have provisions that extend home rule to qualifying local 
governments.62  While home rule does not guarantee cities 
complete autonomy from their states, it does establish a degree 
of self-determination for municipalities that go far beyond 
Hunter’s cramped conception of them.63  Even absent home 
rule, most municipalities exhibit democratic attributes, popu-
larly selected executives and legislatures, court systems, and 
administrative structures.64  Cities hold elections, levy taxes, 
provide for the security of residents, and engage in a host of 
other activities independently of states.  In light of these regu-
lar exercises of traditional governmental functions, cities are 
today—and to an extent always have been—a major site of self-
governance. 
Neither does Hunter reflect the fact that cities have become 
important economic players—rivaling nations in some cases.65 
As Richard Schragger has documented, the ten largest metro-
politan regions globally account for over one-fifth of the eco-
nomic activity of the entire world.66  New York, Los Angeles, 
Chicago, the District of Columbia, Dallas, and Philadelphia fall 
within the top thirty economies worldwide.67  For some densely 
populated cities, like Phoenix, Arizona, the city accounts for 
seven out of every ten jobs in the state.68 
Hunter as a shorthand for the constitutional invisibility of 
the city also fails to accurately describe constitutional doctrine. 
61 See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2257, 2278 
(2003) (noting that states “beg[a]n to enact constitutional and statutory measures 
that explicitly identified towns and cities as legally independent entities” around 
the end of the nineteenth century). 
62 See JON D. RUSSELL & AARON  BOSTROM, AM. CITY  CTY. EXCH., FEDERALISM, 
DILLON RULE AND HOME RULE 6 (2016), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2016/ 
01/2016-ACCE-White-Paper-Dillon-House-Rule-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
XJ7K-QZD2].  Qualifications for home rule vary, as do the mechanics of recogni-
tion. See id. 
63 See Nestor M. Davidson, Local Constitutions, 99 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020) (manuscript at 33–40), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=3461745&download=yes [https://perma.cc/8HDJ-NJQX]. 
64 See Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 
569 (2017). 
65 Local governments generated over $1.6 billion in revenue in 2012, just 
$300 million shy of the amount generated by states in the same period, and spent 
just about as much. JEFFREY L. BARNETT, CINDY L. SHECKELLS, SCOTT PETERSON & 
ELIZABETH M. TYDINGS, 2012 CENSUS OF  GOVERNMENTS: FINANCE—STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT SUMMARY REPORT 7–8 (2014). 
66 RICHARD  SCHRAGGER, CITY  POWER: URBAN  GOVERNANCE IN A  GLOBAL  AGE 28 
(2016). 
67 Id. at 28–29. 
68 Id. at 28. 
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While the principle is often carelessly invoked where courts 
seek to downplay municipal autonomy, other cases have lim-
ited its reach, as the Court itself has acknowledged.69  Schrag-
ger, in noting how courts inconsistently invoke the Hunter rule, 
has referred to the numerous departures and qualifications as 
a “shadow doctrine” that treats municipalities as possessing at 
least some constitutional personality.70 
One early manifestation of this shadow doctrine arose in 
1960 in a case called Gomillion v. Lightfoot.71  In Gomillion, the 
state of Alabama had redrawn the municipal boundaries of the 
City of Tuskegee so as to cut the African American population 
of the city from 400 to about five without reducing the white 
population.72  The state of Alabama resisted a Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendment challenge to its new map on the theory 
that Hunter entitled state governments to reorganize cities 
without limit.  The Court rejected this argument, stressing that 
Hunter was not a carte blanche for states to treat cities however 
they wanted, and emphasized that states were subject to at 
least some constitutional limitations on their control of munici-
palities.73 Gomillion was perhaps the most transparent state-
ment of constitutional limits on plenary state authority over 
local government; but it is not the only one.  In City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, Philadelphia, along with other municipal 
governments and private entities, sued New Jersey and suc-
ceeded in preventing it from enforcing a discriminatory waste 
management statute in violation of the Commerce Clause.74 
69 Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (applying 
Hunter but noting that “the broad statements as to state control over municipal 
corporations contained in Hunter have undoubtedly been qualified by the hold-
ings of later cases”). 
70 Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore and 
the Political Currency of Local Government, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 393, 407–09 (2002) 
(describing this “shadow doctrine”). 
71 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
72 Id. at 341. 
73 Id. at 344–45 (“[T]he Court has never acknowledged that the States have 
power to do as they will with municipal corporations regardless of consequences. 
Legislative control of municipalities, no less than other state power, lies within the 
scope of relevant limitations imposed by the United States Constitution.”).  It 
bears noting though that the plaintiffs in Gomillion were individual residents of 
Tuskegee, not the City of Tuskegee itself.  So while that case can be read for the 
proposition that “The City of Tuskegee” was simply a party by dint of the aggregate 
interests of the African American residents who had been racially excluded from 
the redrawn municipal boundaries—a kind of derivative or aggregate claim—it is 
still cited as a limitation on the authority of states against the municipality. See 
Morris, supra note 43, at 4 n.7. 
74 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). 
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One could argue that Gomillion and City of Philadelphia do 
little to undermine Hunter because they demonstrate only that 
individual city residents possess constitutional rights, or that a 
city may assert constitutional rights against other states, but 
not the city’s own state.  But other cases undermine that rea-
soning.  In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Court 
recognized that a city school district could sue the state for an 
equal protection violation when the state passed a ballot mea-
sure prohibiting the district from implementing a school inte-
gration program.75  In Romer v. Evans, the named plaintiffs 
included the City of Aspen, the City of Boulder, and the City 
and County of Denver.76  These municipalities had passed or-
dinances protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination, 
which were then invalidated by a statewide Colorado ballot 
measure.77  The Romer Court affirmed the cities’ claims that 
the measure violated their constituents’ constitutional rights.78 
In both cases, in keeping with the tacit nature of this “shadow 
doctrine,” the Court simply assumed that municipal corpora-
tions had the capacity to sue their own state governments on 
theories of constitutional rights shared by private corporations 
and natural persons. 
Sometimes, much as with private corporations or non-
profit associations, it appears the municipal corporation as-
serts the aggregated rights of its constituents.  For example, 
according to one commentator, a local school district could 
state a claim against its state because it “ha[d] standing . . . to 
vindicate the constitutional rights of its students to attend de-
segregated schools” in addition to “its own constitutional duty 
to redress the effects of school system segregation.”79  Some-
75 458 U.S. 457, 459, 487 (1982).  The Court remarked that the school dis-
trict was “largely coterminous with the city of Seattle.” Id.  The lower court had 
expressly identified the school district plaintiffs as “lawfully organized and func-
tioning municipal corporation[s].”  Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty.  v. State, 
473 F. Supp. 996, 998 (W.D. Wash. 1979). 
76 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625 (1996) (“Other plaintiffs (also respon-
dents here) included the three municipalities whose ordinances we have cited and 
certain other governmental entities which had acted earlier to protect homosexu-
als from discrimination but would be prevented by Amendment 2 from continuing 
to do so.”); Copy of Complaint Filed in Romer v. Evans, QUEER RESOURCES DIREC-
TORY http://www.qrd.org/qrd/usa/legal/colorado/Evans-v-Romer.BRIEF 
[https://perma.cc/E6SE-2724]. 
77 Romer, 517 U.S. at 625. 
78 Id. at 635–36. 
79 1 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 3:8 (2020); see also Exeter-West 
Greenwich Reg’l Sch. Dist. v. Pontarelli, 788 F.2d 47, 48, 54 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(awarding attorney fees to school district in establishment clause challenge 
against state officers). 
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thing of this reasoning may be behind Denver and Aspen’s 
standing to sue Colorado on behalf of its gay and lesbian citi-
zens in Romer v. Evans.  Kathleen Morris’s discussion of San 
Francisco’s litigation against California’s ban on same sex mar-
riage follows a similar path.80  The right to marry is obviously 
an individual right.  San Francisco’s standing to bring suit on 
behalf of its citizens seems to derive from the rights of those 
citizens who wanted to marry their same sex partners.  Without 
some referent in its residents’ individual right to marry, the city 
would have little ability to assert a violation on its own behalf.81 
A variant of this thinking is that municipalities may sue 
when the right they vindicate itself contains an aggregate fea-
ture.  Just as Citizens United stated that private corporations 
can engage in political speech, because they aggregate the 
speech rights of their shareholders,82 Judge Posner speculated 
in Creek v. Village of Westhaven that municipalities may assert 
First Amendment speech rights on similar grounds.83  “To the 
extent . . . that a municipality is the voice of its residents—is, 
indeed, a megaphone amplifying voices that might not other-
wise be audible,” he stated, “a curtailment of its right to speak 
might be thought a curtailment of the unquestioned First 
Amendment rights of those residents.”84 
Sometimes, though, courts seem to recognize municipal 
constitutional rights that appear reposed in the person of the 
city itself or related to its unique function as a municipal gov-
ernment.  It was the city’s Commerce Clause injury vindicated 
in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.85  In United States v. 50 
Acres of Land, the Court held that the city of Duncanville, 
Texas, could state a Takings claim in its own right against the 
80 Morris, supra note 43, at 10–11. 
81 See id. 
82 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (“If the First Amendment 
has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations 
of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech.”); see also id. at 392 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (stating that corporate speech is protected because it is “the speech of 
many individual Americans, who have associated in a common cause, giving the 
leadership of the party the right to speak on their behalf”). 
83 80 F.3d 186, 192 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Nor is it out of the question that a 
municipality could have First Amendment rights.”).  This speculation was in the 
face of fairly consistent holdings that municipalities do not have First Amendment 
rights. See id. at 192–93 (compiling cases). 
84 Id. at 193.  The Tenth Circuit suggested the Hunter principle stands “only 
for the limited proposition that a municipality may not bring a constitutional 
challenge against its creating state when the constitutional provision that sup-
plies the basis for the complaint was written to protect individual rights, as 
opposed to collective or structural rights.”  Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 
161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998). 
85 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). 
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federal government even though the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment refers only to “private prop-
erty.”86  Municipal corporations can raise Tenth Amendment 
claims if commandeered by the federal government to enforce 
federal law,87 whether or not the state consents to the com-
mandeering.88  And then there’s the panoply of procedural con-
stitutional rights that cities assert as a matter of course, 
without much fuss or reflection, such as Seventh Amendment 
rights to trial by jury89 and some aspects of due process.90 
For purposes of challenging Hunter, it does not matter 
whether the municipality is thought to be a conduit for the 
rights of its residents—a kind of aggregate theory of the munic-
ipal corporation—or claiming rights of its own—a variety of the 
real entity theory.  The frequent departures from the Hunter 
doctrine suggest that the courts have some role in “limiting 
state attempts to interfere with local affairs in certain constitu-
tional contexts,” particularly those where local governments 
86 United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 30–31 (1984) (“[I]t is most 
reasonable to construe the reference to ‘private property’ in the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment as encompassing the property of state and local govern-
ments when it is condemned by the United States.”). 
87 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 898, 904, 935 (1997) (involving a suit 
against the federal government by a sheriff in Montana); see also City of Philadel-
phia v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 916 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding the U.S. 
Attorney General lacked constitutional authority to impose new immigration-
related conditions on federal funding for local law enforcement); City of S.F. v. 
Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231–35 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We conclude that, under the 
principle of Separation of Powers and in consideration of the Spending Clause, 
which vests exclusive power to Congress to impose conditions on federal grants, 
the Executive Branch may not refuse to disperse the federal grants in question 
without congressional authorization.”). 
88 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (“Where Congress 
exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the 
constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.”); Bd. of 
Nat. Res. of Wash. v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 946 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[A]llowing the 
Counties to assert the State’s Tenth Amendment claim . . . will serve . . . principles 
of federalism if the State had no plans to challenge the Act.”). 
89 Bowers v. City of Philadelphia, No. 06–3229, 2008 WL 5234357, at *5 (E.D. 
Pa. Dec. 12, 2008) (“Nevertheless, the City has a constitutional right under the 
Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution to a jury trial.”); Doctor 
John’s, Inc. v. City of Sioux City467 F. Supp. 2d 925, 939 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (“The 
court will determine ‘constitutionality’ issues that fall within its province, but 
consistent with the parties’ Seventh Amendment rights to jury trial, the court has 
preserved for jury determination ‘applicability’ and ‘damages’ issues.”). 
90 Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 721 
F.3d 264, 291 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[B]ecause of the ready availability of preliminary 
injunctive relief, there simply is no need to abridge the City’s due process rights in 
favor of the Center’s free speech guarantee.”); DiMaggio, LLC. v. City of S.F., 187 
F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (finding that City had insufficient con-
tacts with forum to satisfy Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements for 
personal jurisdiction). 
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are important in “securing federal constitutional norms” not 
readily enforceable by court adjudication.91 
Nor does it seem principled to maintain that municipal 
corporations may assert a host of rights in disputes with pri-
vate parties, the federal government, and each other, but not 
with their own state.  Courts assemble the corpus of constitu-
tional doctrine through case-by-case, common law-like deci-
sion making.  As has happened with private corporations, a 
municipality’s assertion of rights in one case anchors its ability 
to assert them in another—or demands some justification why 
it cannot.92  Too often courts use Hunter and its ilk to avoid 
offering any justification at all.93  Perhaps the most compelling 
reason to abandon the Hunter rule is what it costs us.  Munici-
pal invisibility robs us of the perspective of municipal entities 
on the major constitutional issues that affect them.  In an era 
when urban versus rural is the increasingly dominant cleavage 
in American political life,94 and as more of the country’s popu-
lation trends toward cities,95 local governments represent poli-
ties with distinctive perspectives backed by substantial 
populaces.  Contemporary cities thus promise a rich input to 
federal constitutional questions that is, to a large extent, lost 
by rendering them constitutionally invisible.  Just as states’ 
separateness from the federal government promises the devel-
opment of different policies and preferences, so too can cities 
serve as loci of constitutional interpretation by advancing dif-
91 David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitution-
alism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 568 (1999). 
92 See infra subpart I.C; see also Miller, supra note 12, at 915 (“Once a 
corporation is deemed a person for one right, reason demands an explanation why 
it is not a person for another.”). 
93 See State v. City of Birmingham, No. 1180342, 2019 WL 6337424, at *9–10 
(Ala. Nov. 27, 2019) (relying on the Hunter principle to deny Birmingham federal 
and state speech rights regarding display of a Confederate monument). 
94 See, e.g., JONATHAN RODDEN, WHY CITIES LOSE: THE DEEP ROOTS OF THE URBAN-
RURAL POLITICAL DIVIDE 10–12 (2019) (describing urban-rural polarization and its 
“especially consequential” effect on American elections); Emily Badger, How the 
Rural-Urban Divide Became America’s Political Fault Line, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/upshot/america-political-divide-
urban-rural.html [https://perma.cc/RHA4-Y5W7] (“[U]rban]-rural polarization 
has become particularly acute in America: particularly entrenched, particularly 
hostile, particularly lopsided in its consequences.”). 
95 See UNIV. MICH. CTR. FOR  SUSTAINABLE  SYS., U.S. CITIES (2019) http:// 
css.umich.edu/sites/default/files/US%20Cities_CSS09-06_e2019.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9G6T-ZAYM] (“Approximately 84% of the U.S. population lives in urban 
areas, up from 64% in 1950.  By 2050, 89% of the U.S. population and 68% of the 
world population is projected to live in urban areas.”). 
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ferent policy and litigation positions.96  Local governments may 
actually serve as more effective laboratories of constitutional 
experimentation than states because they are more numerous, 
feature a greater variety of perspectives, and have more direct 
contact with their residents.  Different municipal governments 
may object to their state’s gun laws on different theories, craft-
ing subtly different regulatory regimes in each of these 
localities. 
As David Barron has written, “[C]ities are often the institu-
tions that are most directly responsible for structuring political 
struggles over the most contentious of public questions”— 
which certainly includes firearm policy—and are “often 
uniquely well positioned to give content to the substantive con-
stitutional principles that should inform the consideration of 
such public questions.”97  Federal constitutional protection 
may be necessary to ensure that local governments can bring 
their “special institutional capacities to bear” in these 
disputes.98 
The loss caused by municipal invisibility is not solely infor-
mational.  It is also participatory and intermediating.  In terms 
of participation, Heather Gerken has written how, in those ar-
eas where policies have a federal, state, and local character, 
municipal governments may want not only exit, they may want 
voice as well.  As she describes it, federalism and localism are 
not just about giving a subdivision of the national government 
a chance to legislate in some discrete local “sphere.”99  It’s also 
about allowing them to work within “nested governing struc-
tures” that operate in a vertical manner much as the separa-
tion of powers operates horizontally.100  In that model, the 
“checks and balances” of local government “depends not on 
separation and independence, but on integration and interde-
pendence.”101  In this model, recognizing the constitutional 
dignity of local governments—at least with respect to some 
kinds of rights claims—is akin to branches of government 
96 See Barron, supra note 91, at 568. See generally Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff 
Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1232 (2018) (discussing affirmative litigation by 
municipalities as a form of institutional validation and “state building”). 
97 Barron, supra note 91, at 491. 
98 Id. 
99 See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 26–27 (2010). 
100 Id. at 25. 
101 Id. at 34. 
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working out over time, in iterated events, what kinds of powers 
each of them have and under what circumstances.102 
In this manner, local governments, along with other kinds 
of institutions, like churches, universities, and other associa-
tions, also perform a vital intermediating role.103  In saying 
this, we understand the city’s mediating role in the way Meir 
Dan-Cohen wrote about it.104  Municipal governments mediate 
in the negative sense—acting as a buffer between national or 
state government and the citizen.105  For example, local govern-
ments organized resistance to the Alien and Sedition Acts in 
the eighteenth century,106 the institution of slavery in the nine-
teenth,107 state anti-gay legislation in the twentieth,108 and 
federal deportation practices in the twenty first.109  To protect 
individual dissent “the Constitution goes out of its way to cre-
ate, and protect, institutions where individuals who may not be 
able to act by themselves can come together with others to 
associate, organize and have their voices be heard.”110 
102 See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, 
Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 
30–32 (2014) (describing how constitutional meaning can become fixed by histori-
cal practice); see also Weinstock, supra note 38, at 264 (“Self-determining groups 
are analogous to rights-bearing individuals”). 
103 See JACOB T. LEVY, RATIONALISM, PLURALISM & FREEDOM 93 (2015). 
104 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Between Selves and Collectives: Toward a Jurispru-
dence of Identity, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1213–14 (1994) (identifying the posi-
tional and functional role of intermediary institutions). 
105 See Weinstock, supra note 38, at 270. 
106 See Douglas Bradburn, A Clamor in the Public Mind: Opposition to the Alien 
and Sedition Acts, 65 WM. & MARY Q. 565, 566 (2008) (“The Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions, the most visible opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts, have never 
been placed in their true context: as part of a broader movement of petitioning and 
remonstrance, the concerted effort of numerous local communities not only in 
Virginia and Kentucky but also in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, 
and elsewhere.”). 
107 See, e.g., H. ROBERT BAKER, THE RESCUE OF JOSHUA GLOVER: A FUGITIVE SLAVE, 
THE  CONSTITUTION, AND THE  COMING OF THE  CIVIL  WAR 53 (2006) (describing the 
collaboration of a local vigilance committees with local officials to prevent a slave 
rendition in Boston). 
108 See, e.g., Herrera Joined by Los Angeles, Santa Clara Counterparts in Suing 
to Invalidate Prop 8, CITY ATT’Y OF S.F. (Nov. 5, 2008), https://www.sfcityattorney. 
org/2008/11/05/herrera-joined-by-los-angeles-santa-clara-counterparts-in-su-
ing-to-invalidate-prop-8/ [https://perma.cc/82PV-6WFP] (describing California 
cities’ constitutional challenge to Prop 8’s ban on same-sex marriage). 
109 See SARAH HERMAN PECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44795, “SANCTUARY” JURIS-
DICTIONS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL POLICIES AND RELATED LITIGATION 19–32 (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44795.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2HB-E2ER] 
(outlining recent litigation about local and state resistance to federal immigration 
policy enforcement). 
110 Vikram David Amar, Is It Appropriate, Under the Constitution, for State and 
Local Governments to Weigh in on the War on Terror and a Possible War with Iraq?, 
FINDLAW (Mar. 7, 2003), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/is-it-
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But municipal governments also mediate in the positive 
sense of “creat[ing] habitats within which individuals can flour-
ish.”111  Citizens often find localities the primary situs of gov-
ernment through which they can express their preferences, 
and cities provide a form of democracy that is particularly sali-
ent because of its proximity to the people.  Indeed, Americans 
increasingly relocate to cities so that they can find a place 
where their preferences are at least respected and perhaps also 
more widely shared with others. Hunter saps municipal gov-
ernments of the tools necessary to efficiently develop the kind 
of suite of goods and services that makes meaningful choice 
possible.112  Without the fetters of Hunter, cities become free to 
respond to these preferences, to produce goods that provide 
choice, and better enable self-selection by citizens, who can 
more readily sort themselves among different localities than 
different states.  If Anaheim, California and Reno, Nevada have 
similarly gun-friendly laws, a Los Angeles resident who prefers 
lighter firearm regulation will find it much easier to relocate to 
the former than the latter.113 
But we do not think that the authority to participate in a 
market is the only way the city intermediates in this positive 
sense.114  In participating in this form of community, and in 
particular this form of government, the individual comes to 
learn how and what it means to be a free citizen in a well-
ordered society.115  Simply, the flourishing Dan-Cohen identi-
fies requires a physical proximity with others who are also free 
to express, deliberate, and act.  Hannah Arendt remarked that 
this type of freedom—one different from mere liberation—is a 




111 Meir Dan-Cohen, supra note 104, at 1214. 
112 Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1583, 1591 (2010) (“By locating the institutions to produce public goods at the 
lowest possible level, the creation of sub-governments reduces the monitoring 
problem and thus mitigates agency problems.”). 
113 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416, 417–18 (1956). 
114 The market participant model of local government is thoroughly investi-
gated in SCHRAGGER, supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
115 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 512–13 ((J.P. Mayer ed., 
George Lawrence trans., Harper Perennial Modern Classics 2006) (1835) (“By dint 
of working for the good of his fellow citizens, he in the end acquires the habit and 
taste for serving them.”); cf. Weinstock, supra note 38, at 273 (noting the episte-
mic advantages of cities where the inhabitants have “direct access to facts about 
how to realize desirable public policy ends in the particular spatial contexts that 
cities represent”). 
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“worldly space to make its appearance.”116  Independent of its 
participation in a decentralized market, the city’s value is in its 
ability to provide this public, political concept of freedom.117 
Both the negative and the positive mediating function of 
the city rely on at least some measure of freedom to decide how 
and in what way to cooperate with or resist federal and state 
policies.118  In the negative mediating sense, a city needs some 
measure of autonomy to position itself between the individual 
and the state.  In the positive sense, it needs to have the power 
to produce those kinds of public goods that makes flourishing 
possible.  The city’s intermediating role in either of these senses 
is not possible when the city is routinely eclipsed in our consti-
tutional order by the state.  As Tocqueville cautioned, the lib-
erty generated by local government is the most vulnerable to 
outside encroachments, and also the most necessary, for local 
governments are the true “laboratories of democracy” where 
people learn how to use and enjoy freedom.119 
C. Toward a Common Law of Municipal Personhood 
Status is one of the most important, yet least visible, no-
tions at play in common law legal systems.  To say that a 
human or an entity has legal status is to say that they have 
enforceable rights under a jurisdiction’s law, and that they may 
appear before courts and be recognized in efforts to enforce 
those rights.120  In the United States, legal status is mediated 
by the doctrine of legal personhood.  Legal persons are recog-
nized as valid subjects of the law.  In most instances, status is 
uncontroversial because most litigants are humans, and natu-
ral persons may assert any legal right they possess in state or 
federal courts.  Less obviously, law also extends personhood to 
some entities that are not human individuals.  Private corpora-
tions, for instance, have legal personhood for many (though by 
no means all) purposes, even including many constitutional 
rights.121  Yet this legal fiction is not a simple equation by 
116 Hannah Arendt, Freedom and Politics: A Lecture, 14 CHI. REV. 28, 30 
(1960). 
117 See SCHRAGGER, supra note 66, at 77. 
118 See Gerken, supra note 99, at 34. 
119 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 115, at 63 (“Local institutions are to liberty what 
primary schools are to science . . . they teach people to appreciate its peaceful 
enjoyment and accustom them to make use of it.”). 
120 RIPKEN, supra note 53, at 48 (“The legal language of personhood has sym-
bolic, expressive, and constitutive functions . . . .”). 
121 See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“[T]he words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corpora-
tions, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock 
companies, as well as individuals . . . .”). 
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which law regards non-human entities as equivalent to natural 
persons.  Much controversy accompanies what constitutional 
rights corporations should bear, as the ongoing controversy 
over the Supreme Court’s extension of Speech Clause rights to 
corporations illustrates.122 
The legal status of municipal corporations raises similar 
difficult issues.  Answering this question is a necessary task 
that extends far beyond whether cities can assert Second 
Amendment rights.  How cities stand before the law affects how 
and whether they can sue and be sued and what rights they 
may and may not assert.  And, as noted above, in our common 
law system of adjudication, how the court administers one set 
of constitutional rights for municipal corporations becomes 
precedential for how it may administer another set.  But, as the 
foregoing discussion illustrates, courts have an account of the 
legal status of municipal corporations that is perhaps even 
more fractured than it is for private corporations. Hunter de-
nies municipal corporations legal status completely, holding 
that they are, constitutionally at least, invisible nonpersons, 
most acutely when bringing claims against their states, but 
also more generally.  The persistence of Hunter may derive from 
the ease with which it erases the question of municipal per-
sonhood, allowing courts to avoid grappling with this challeng-
ing issue.  Yet at the same time, cities are municipal 
corporations, and corporations are the archetypal artificial per-
son to which law grants robust (though not unlimited) legal 
status.123  Given this, as well as the increasing vitality of the 
city in modern life, it has become harder for courts to simply 
122 Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 385–93 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (stating that individuals working through corporate form have First 
Amendment protection), and Bradley A. Smith, Celebrate the Citizens United Dec-
ade, WALL  ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/celebrate-the-
citizens-united-decade-11579553962 [https://perma.cc/UDV9-87C5] (“Citizens 
United unleashed rapid political diversification.”), with Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
at 426–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that corporations would not have been 
understood as within scope of First Amendment protections), and Tim Lau, Citi-
zens United Explained, BRENNAN  CTR. FOR  JUST. (Dec. 12, 2019), https:// 
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/citizens-united-explained 
[https://perma.cc/QQ6C-KME4] (“While wealthy donors, corporations, and spe-
cial interest groups have long had an outsized influence in elections, that sway 
has dramatically expanded since the Citizens United decision, with negative reper-
cussions for American democracy and the fight against political corruption.”). 
123 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) 
(discussing the corporate right to political speech); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 
U.S. 307, 325 (1978) (finding a corporate right against warrantless inspections by 
workplace safety regulators); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 
249–51 (1936) (holding that a press corporation is a person entitled to the protec-
tion of the First and Fourteenth Amendments). 
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dismiss municipalities’ legal status.  As we have shown in this 
Part, cities sue and are sued, and courts permit them to assert 
some rights but not others.  The practical reality of a robust, if 
patchwork, legal status persists alongside Hunter—the 
“shadow doctrine” of local government law.  As Schragger has 
argued, courts leverage the inconsistent doctrine of municipal 
corporations’ legal status to make cities “disappear and reap-
pear at will.”124 
The need for a coherent law of municipal corporations’ le-
gal status is evident, but also so large an issue it lies beyond 
the scope of this paper.  Instead, our ambitions are more mod-
est.  We seek to supply a rough sketch of ways that courts 
might conceptualize the legal status of the city, one which may, 
in turn, supply a vocabulary for the larger theoretical question 
of the role of the city in our legal order. 
One such approach would be to embrace the broadest ver-
sion of the Hunter doctrine and declare cities mere artificial 
entities that have zero legal status.  While some courts con-
tinue to embrace this approach, we have explained above why 
it fails descriptively and normatively.125 
Another model would be to regard the city as having legal 
status derived from its citizens.  The notion that collective enti-
ties have legal status as aggregations of their members has 
emerged as the leading theory of, for example, corporate legal 
personhood.126  This model tracks intuitively from private cor-
porations to local governments.  Just as one could conceive of 
corporate rights as derived from the rights of its members, so 
could one conceive of municipal rights as derived from those of 
its residents. 
Operationalizing this derivative notion of city status 
presents some challenges.  One challenge, common to all kinds 
of associations, is how to determine whose rights to aggregate. 
Even small cities have heterogeneous populations representing 
different opinions on policy matters.  One approach would be to 
treat the opinion of the majority of residents as the aggregate 
will of the city.  For constitutional tort liability, for instance, 
municipalities can be responsible for the customs or practices 
of its agents, even if not formally codified as city policy.127 
Alternatively, a control group, such as the mayor or city coun-
124 Richard C. Schragger, supra note 70, at 416. 
125 See supra subpart I.B. 
126 See, e.g., RIPKEN, supra note 53, at 29–39; David Millon, Theories of the 
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 223–25 (discussing the aggregation conception). 
127 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). 
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cil, may serve as a proxy for citizens’ preferences.  (Municipali-
ties are typically liable for unconstitutional policies enacted by 
their political leadership, irrespective of the support of a major-
ity of the city’s constituents.128)  And focus on a “control group” 
is how law often treats issues of right and culpability for private 
corporations.129  Yet both of these possible solutions elide 
rather than solve what Abram Chayes has termed the “repre-
sentation of interest problem.”130  In either case, the city is not 
acting as an aggregation of all its members, but rather as an 
aggregation of just some of them. 
Another problem with aggregating the rights of the city’s 
citizens under this model relates to the nature of rights a city 
could assert.  A proxy approach equates the capacity of local 
governments to make rights-based claims with its citizens’ ca-
pacity to assert those rights.  Of course, not all rights are con-
ducive to this approach.  Some kinds of rights may not be 
intelligible when considered in the aggregate.131  Some kinds of 
rights may aggregate but generate challenges because of the 
governmental nature of the municipal corporation.132  Still, 
putting these challenges aside, a court could recognize a city’s 
ability to claim speech or voting rights (even though a city 
cannot speak or vote) to the extent that the city’s residents’ 
speech or voting rights had been infringed.  This would allow 
cities to vindicate the derivative rights of some or all of its 
constituents; yet it still may fail to capture those kinds of rights 
that make sense only in their aggregate sense.  For example, 
the harm to a congregation in a Free Exercise case (for exam-
ple, a state selecting the church’s minister) isn’t necessarily 
reflected in the aggregation of an individual constitutional in-
dignity; it’s the harm to the congregation as a congregation.133 
Since the aggregation model locates rights in entities only to 
128 See id. at 694. 
129 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 706–07 (2014) 
(ascribing religious conscience of closely held private corporation to its sharehold-
ers and managers); id. at 754 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Workers who sustain the 
operations of [for-profit] corporations commonly are not drawn from one religious 
community.”); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) (relying on “cor-
porate democracy” to manage agents in intra-corporate disputes over speech 
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978))). 
130 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1281, 1310 (1976). 
131 See infra Part II. 
132 See id. 
133 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 
U.S. 171, 188 (2012) (“Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minis-
ter, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere 
employment decision.  Such action interferes with the internal governance of the 
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the extent that they derive from individuals, though, it is not 
clear what room this creates for the city to assert rights on its 
own behalf that are, in a sense, more than the sum of the rights 
of its residents. 
As an alternative, law could theorize cities as having legal 
status in their own right, independently of their citizens.  This 
approach would regard the city as more than just the sum of its 
residents, and instead consider the city as a distinct entity 
capable of asserting legal personhood on its own behalf.  This 
notion, too, has intuitive appeal.  We often think of cities as 
possessing identities independent of their residents, rooted in 
their geographies, histories, and cultures.134  Just as with 
other institutions like churches or social clubs, a city’s identity 
transcends its membership at any given moment.135 
Yet as with the aggregation theory, how to translate this 
notion into a legally functional account presents a harder case. 
What thing “is” the city?136  One option would again be to 
choose a control group—mayor, city council—to treat as 
equivalent to the municipality.  Under this approach, though, 
the control group would be disengaged from the notion of citi-
zens’ preferences; law would regard it as the city even if it acted 
contrary to the will of the citizenry.137  But what substantive 
rights would such a control group be able to assert?  In some 
cases, state action limits a city’s ability to govern its own af-
fairs, such as reallocating its geography or removing discretion 
over subject matter, such as education, that is a core subject 
matter traditionally dedicated to local control.138  If we theorize 
church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will per-
sonify its beliefs.”). 
134 Cf. Mihailis E. Diamantis, Limiting Identity in Criminal Law, 60 B.C. L. Rev. 
2011, 2026 (2019) (discussing the psychological challenges of associating a cor-
poration with a single, stable identity). 
135 See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Successor Identity, 36 YALE J. ON  REG. 1, 31 
(2019) (“Corporations, with their generally hierarchical structure and goal-di-
rected operation, are archetypical entitive groups.  As a result, people perceive 
corporations as being capable of intentional action and as deserving punishment 
when they act badly.”); see also Donald T. Campbell, Common Fate, Similarity, 
and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons as Social Entities, 3 
BEHAV. SCI. 14, 17–18 & n.2 (1958) (defining “entitativity” and describing the 
characteristics that make “discrete elements” more likely to be “perceived as parts 
of a whole organization”). 
136 Cf. Weinstock, supra note 38, at 267 (observing that there is a “folk usage 
of the term ‘city’ . . . at odds with legal positivism about cities”). 
137 Cf. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978) (holding 
that municipalities are liable for the official policies of their leaders). 
138 E.g., City of New York v. State, 655 N.E.2d 649, 651 (N.Y. 1995) (holding 
that New York City did not have standing to sue the state of New York when the 
state limited the city’s management of its own education system). 
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the city’s legal personhood as inhering in the municipality it-
self, cities could challenge these actions because they re-
present harms to the city itself—its geography, its scope of 
authority, its capacity to effectively govern its constituents.139 
By contrast, and unlike the aggregation theory, this approach 
would not enable municipal corporations to act on behalf of its 
denizens.  If the city’s personhood is distinct from and unteth-
ered to its residents, absent some notion of third-party stand-
ing, this undermines the city’s ability to seek redress for 
infringements of those residents’ right to vote or their freedom 
to marry that the city as a city does not possess.140 
One final option would be to think of a city’s constitutional 
rights less in relation to a binary—person or not—and more 
according to the kinds of rights municipal corporations are 
best situated to advance.141  Such an approach would take into 
consideration both the institutional features of the particular 
constitutional right as well as the corporate—and governmen-
tal—nature of the city.  Scholars have advanced this approach 
with respect to private corporate rights,142 and it seems prom-
ising when considering municipal corporate rights as well.143 
These brief outlines of how we might model the city’s per-
sonhood do not exhaust all possible options.144  Nor does space 
permit elaboration of a common law of municipal legal person-
ality.  Rather, we highlight an issue that was immanent 
throughout this Part, and that has been an undercurrent of 
139 See David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the 
Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2223 (2006) (“[C]ities are better viewed as sites 
for small-scale political contestation and problem-solving on matters that are 
within their capacity to resolve through the exercise of their own policymaking 
authority.”). 
140 For instance, a private corporation lacks Fifth Amendment self-incrimina-
tion rights and cannot advance them on behalf of its human agents. See Wilson v. 
United States, 221 U.S. 361, 383–84 (1911). 
141 See infra Part II. 
142 See, e.g., RIPKEN, supra note 53, at 54 (“An adequate account of the corpo-
ration requires us to view the entity broadly, focusing on its varied roles and 
multiple purposes.”); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 
2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1630 (arguing that “corporate personhood should be 
understood as merely recognizing the corporation’s ability to hold rights in order 
to protect the people involved”). 
143 See Yishai Blank, City Speech, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 365, 383 (2019) 
(applying this conception to municipal speech rights); Hannah J. Wiseman, Re-
thinking Municipal Corporate Rights, 61 B.C. L. REV. 591, 600 (2020) (“[M]unicipal 
corporate rights are valuable if granting rights to the municipality would further 
the purpose of the right.”). 
144 See, e.g., RICHARD  BRIFFAULT & LAURIE  REYNOLDS, CASES AND  MATERIALS ON 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 73–187(8th ed. 2016) (providing three models of 
local government: “agent of the state”; “autonomous, democratic polity”; and 
“quasi-proprietary firm”). 
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American local government law for two centuries.  Legal status 
is a prior issue to any assertion of rights, whether by a natural 
person, private corporation, or municipal entity.145  That 
courts have not overtly addressed this issue does not mean 
that there is no law governing cities’ legal status, only that the 
law is fractured and unpredictable.  Ultimately, questions of 
legal status are inevitable, whether we address them in the 
context of a private corporation, or a municipal one.146  The 
balance of this Article addresses some mechanisms that can 
structure the inquiry when the right is the one to keep and bear 
arms, but our observation may be broader, and help begin a 
conversation about a more transparent, thorough, and coher-
ent doctrine of municipal personality going forward. 
II 
THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND THE CITY 
Part I of this Article explained why the conventional wis-
dom of the city as constitutionally powerless is neither descrip-
tively accurate nor normatively desirable.  Cities do and should 
be able to claim some constitutional rights.  However, to say 
that a city has some claim to constitutional rights is not to say 
that it has or should have the full panoply of rights available to 
human beings, or to say that it can exercise federal constitu-
tional rights on the exact same terms as other rights-bearing 
entities.  For example, it would be incoherent to say that a city 
has a right to habeas corpus.147  It could create serious con-
flicts with other rights to say that a city can freely practice 
religion.148  And, though a city may have some derivative claim 
to equal protection,149 the full extent of equal protection juris-
prudence seems ill-suited to address the kinds of discrimina-
tion a city—as a city—may face.150 
145 See VISA A.J.  KURKI, A THEORY OF LEGAL PERSONHOOD 3–4 (2019). 
146 See Miller, supra note 12, at 927 (“[T]he Court’s modern tendency is to 
concentrate on the scope of the constitutional right, rather than on corporate 
personality.  However, focusing on the right rather than the litigant trends toward 
a ‘real entity by default’ theory of the corporation.”). 
147 See id. at 955. 
148 See Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 576 (1989) 
(stating that government “may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any 
religion or its exercise”). But cf. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 591–92 
(2014) (holding that a municipality does not violate the First Amendment Estab-
lishment Clause by having a sectarian prayer to open meetings). 
149 See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 487 (1982). 
150 Ascribing different rights in different measures to different persons is not 
unusual in constitutional law.  Children do not enjoy the same types or degree of 
constitutional rights as adults; prisoners have different types and degrees of 
rights compared to free people; non-citizens do not enjoy the same rights as 
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The issue of corporate constitutional rights has flummoxed 
courts and commentators for decades,151 and the governmen-
tal nature of the municipal corporation only heightens the com-
plications.152  But, as an entry point to the problem, Justice 
Lewis Powell Jr.’s opinion in First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti153 provides a clue. Bellotti involved a Massachusetts 
law that prohibited private corporate expenditures in support 
or opposition to public referenda, unless such referenda mate-
rially affected “the property, business or assets of the corpora-
tion.”154  The Court struck down the regulation as a First 
Amendment violation.  In doing so, it rejected a blanket appli-
cation of the artificial entity theory for private corporations: 
“Corporate identity has been determinative in several decisions 
denying corporations certain constitutional rights.”155  But 
states do not have unfettered authority to deny their “crea-
tures” all protections of the Constitution.156  Instead, the Court 
reasoned, “[c]ertain ‘purely personal’ guarantees . . . are un-
available to corporations and other organizations because the 
‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been limited 
to the protection of individuals.  Whether or not a particular 
guarantee is ‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to corporations 
for some other reason depends on the nature, history, and 
purpose of the particular constitutional provision.”157 
Bellotti’s footnote provides some limited guidance on how 
to analyze the corporate constitutional rights of any corporate 
entity.158  Although some scholars—including one of the pre-
citizens. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (“[E]ven where 
there is an invasion of protected freedoms ‘the power of the state to control the 
conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults . . . .’” 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
170 (1944))). 
151 Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a 
Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 62 (2005) 
(calling constitutional decisions in this area “ad hoc” and “arbitrary”). 
152 See generally Bendor, supra note 18, at 390–93 (discussing the difficulty in 
applying Hunter). 
153 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
154 Id. at 768 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)). 
155 Id. at 779 n.14. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. (citation omitted).  The mirror of this distinction for municipal corpora-
tions, at least according to one court, seems to be the idea that political subdivi-
sions of states cannot assert “individual” rights (like speech) but can assert 
“structural” or “collective” ones (like the Supremacy Clause).  Branson Sch. Dist. 
RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998).  As we discuss below, the 
right to carry weapons for the purpose of safety has a structural and collective 
feature, in addition to the individual component. 
158 See Fleck & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Phx., 471 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 
2006) (applying Bellotti to company that showed live sex acts); Primera Iglesia 
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sent authors—have criticized Bellotti’s utility,159 it still 
amounts to the only trans-substantive pronouncement by the 
Court on how to analyze constitutional claims by corpora-
tions.160  Assuming Bellotti asks the right question, there are 
good reasons to think that the history, purpose, and nature of 
the Second Amendment is not “purely personal” and, conse-
quently, corporations—and especially municipal corpora-
tions—have some claim to a right to keep and bear arms. 
If that’s the case, then the next question is whether and to 
what extent a municipal corporation should be able to exercise 
that right.  One way to approach a municipal right to keep and 
bear arms is similar to how one of us has approached a munici-
pal right to speak.  First, the constitutionally implicated activ-
ity must be “central to the identity and purpose of the public 
entity” such that allowing another sovereign to override its de-
cision “undermine[s] the reason for allocating institutional dis-
cretion” to that entity in the first place.161  Second, the public 
entity asserting the right must “have the effect of furthering the 
Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1305 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (citing Bellotti regarding corporate free exercise). But cf. Leo Combat, 
LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 15-cv-02323-NYW, 2016 WL 6436653, at *10 (D. 
Colo. Aug. 29, 2016) (“In the absence of any binding authority holding other-
wise. . . .  [A]ny rights extended to a corporation under the Second Amendment are 
dependent upon the entity’s ability to assert individual rights of third-parties on 
their behalf.”); Beckwith Elec. Co. v. Sebelius, 960 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1338 (M.D. 
Fla. 2013) (stating that the “Supreme Court has never resolved” the extent of 
corporate constitutional rights). 
159 See Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seek-
ing a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal 
Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793, 798 n.19 (1996) (“There is no obvious means of 
determining how a right rises to the level of being ‘purely’ personal, or only quali-
fying as somewhat personal, short of the Court announcing a test for what consti-
tutes an individual, non-corporate right.  That, however, is the very point of 
calling a right ‘purely personal.’”); Miller, supra note 12, at 912–13 (criticizing 
Bellotti); Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional 
Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Spe-
cies, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1464–65 (1992) (same). 
160 In a post Bellotti case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused 
to decide whether Boston “had” First Amendment rights to speak and decided the 
case on other grounds.  Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 637 (Mass. 
1978) (“Even if we were to assume that the appropriation of funds by a municipal 
corporation to engage in robust, partisan speech is expression that the First 
Amendment was meant to protect, there are demonstrated, compelling interests 
of the Commonwealth which justify the ‘restraint’ which the Commonwealth has 
placed on the city.”).  The majority in Ysursa dismissed Bellotti as a way to address 
municipal free speech rights.  Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 362 
(2009).  But, to the extent it justified its decision based on a categorical rule of 
municipal powerlessness and constitutional invisibility, we think Ysursa is wrong 
for all the reasons stated in Part I. 
161 David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1637, 1676–77 (2006). 
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values” that particular constitutional right is designed to 
advance.162 
The following subparts address these issues.  Subpart II.A 
shows how the Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms is not purely personal but retains a collective aspect that 
may be exercised in corporate form.163  Then subpart II.B ex-
plains how, post-Heller, the municipal corporation both facili-
tates and constrains the collective aspect of the right to keep 
and bear arms.  Or, to match the theoretical framework for 
municipal speech: the city is an institution that presupposes 
some level of decisional autonomy on how to secure safety 
through the public use of arms, and exercising that right 
through the municipal corporate form advances the goal the 
right to keep and bear arms is supposed to achieve. 
A. The History, Purpose, and Nature of the Second 
Amendment 
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security 
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
shall not be infringed.”164  For over two hundred years, the 
debate over the Second Amendment—to the extent there was a 
debate at all—revolved around whether these words contem-
plated an “individual” or a “collective” right.165  Or, more accu-
rately, whether the Second Amendment protected a right to 
keep and bear arms for personal purposes, or whether it only 
protected the right in relationship to the organized militia.  For 
most of those two centuries, the organized militia supplied the 
institutional structure that answered all the key questions of 
Second Amendment doctrine: what kinds of weapons were pro-
tected,166 where and how they could be carried,167 and what 
162 Id. at 1677; see also Wiseman, supra note 143, at 655–56. 
163 Some of the evidence in this section about the purely personal right first 
appeared in Guns, Inc. but has been updated with new examples and arguments 
and tailored to address the unique issue of municipal rights that Guns, Inc. did 
not explore. See generally Miller, supra note 12. 
164 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
165 These terms are somewhat inapt.  As Justice Stevens noted in Heller, the 
right to keep and bear arms could still be “individual” and yet only exercisable 
through a collective body, like a militia. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 645 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Similarly, there is an “individual” 
right for someone to petition, or to assemble, but the right is expressed through 
collective activity. See id. 
166 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding a short-barreled 
shotgun not protected by the Second Amendment). 
167 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267 (1886) (holding that there is no right 
to form a private armed parade). 
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kinds of persons could carry them.168  Not a single federal case 
in those two centuries struck down a regulation on Second 
Amendment grounds. 
The 2008 Supreme Court decision District of Columbia v. 
Heller169 upended that understanding. Heller involved a Dis-
trict of Columbia regulation that effectively kept individuals 
from keeping functional handguns in their homes for self-de-
fense.170  Dick Heller, a gun-rights advocate and special officer 
in the Federal Judicial Center, challenged the District’s regula-
tion on handguns in the home as a violation of his Second 
Amendment right.  By a five to four majority, authored by Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that individuals had a right 
to keep and bear arms for personal purposes, including self-
defense.171 
Heller emphasized that the “central component” or “core” of 
the Second Amendment right is individual self-defense, and 
that the right to keep and bear arms did not depend on an 
individual being part of an organized militia.172  Although the 
Court downplayed the reading of the right as related to commu-
nity and collective defense, it did not state that the community 
or collective aspects of the right are thereby irrelevant.  The 
right may be for personal purposes, but “simply because the 
right is personal does not mean it is purely personal.”173 
Neither Heller, nor the text, history, or purpose of the Second 
Amendment foreclose some kind of collective understanding of 
the right in addition to a personal right.174 
First, Heller itself seems to contemplate some residual un-
derstanding of the right in a collective sense. Heller denigrates 
the institutional functions of the organized militia, but refers 
repeatedly that the right to keep and bear arms as facilitating 
168 Id. 
169 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
170 See id. at 573–76. 
171 Id. at 636.  The Second Amendment right subsequently was incorporated 
to apply to states and localities in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 
(2010). 
172 Heller, 554 U.S. at 599–600, 630 (emphasis omitted). 
173 See Miller, supra note 12, at 932. 
174 Courts have similarly analyzed the First Amendment’s Speech Clause—a 
provision often used as a model for understanding the Second Amendment—in 
terms of protecting both individual speakers as well as speech itself. See First 
Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (“The proper question 
therefore is not whether corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights . . . . Instead, 
the question must be whether [the challenged law] abridges expression that the 
First Amendment was meant to protect.”). 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-3\CRN303.txt unknown Seq: 36 25-MAR-21 9:56
R
712 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106:677 
an “unorganized” or “citizens’” militia.175  This “unorganized” 
or “citizens’” militia of private arms-bearers is still subject to 
discipline and training,176 although the source of that training 
and discipline is no longer as strongly tied to either the plenary 
authority of Congress, nor to the leadership of the State.177 
Further, the opinion, cryptically, says the right is to secure 
against “private” or “public” violence.178 
Textually, the right is reposed in the “people.”  “Persons” in 
the Constitution tends to denote individuals and individual 
rights bearers, but “the people” refers to collective agents or 
institutional actors.179  The Second Amendment speaks of “the 
people” and of a “militia”; and both connote collective or as-
sociative behavior, as distinguished from the Fifth Amend-
ment180 right against self-incrimination, for example, which 
speaks of a “person” and the singular “himself.”181 
Historical sources contemporary to the Amendment’s rati-
fication support some collective use of arms as well.  English 
monarchs bestowed upon the merchant companies who colo-
nized America power to keep and bear arms to defend the col-
ony.182  Blackstone’s conception of the right to bear arms was 
175 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 596 (“Although the militia consists of all able-bodied 
men, the federally organized militia may consist of a subset of them.”); id. (the 
term “militia” connotes “a body already in existence”); id. at 598 (“[W]hen the able-
bodied men of a nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to 
resist tyranny.”); id. at 600 (“[I]f . . . the organized militia is the sole institutional 
beneficiary of the Second Amendment’s guarantee—it does not assure the exis-
tence of a ‘citizens’ militia’ as a safeguard against tyranny.”). 
176 Id. at 597 (“[T]he adjective ‘well-regulated’ implies nothing more than the 
imposition of proper discipline and training.”). 
177 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2. 
178 Heller, 554 U.S. at 594 (“Thus, the right secured in 1689 . . . was by the 
time of the founding understood to be an individual right protecting against both 
public and private violence.”). 
179 Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
26, 127 (2000). 
180 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
181 See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 600 (discussing protection of Second Amend-
ment rights for “people’s” or “citizens’” militia, as opposed to organized militia). 
182 See THE CHARTER OF  NEW ENGLAND (1620), reprinted in 3 FRANCIS  NEWTON 
THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER OR-
GANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1835 (1909) [hereinafter COLONIAL  CHARTERS]; see 
also THE FIRST CHARTER OF VIRGINIA (1606), reprinted in 7 COLONIAL CHARTERS, supra 
at 3783, 3787 (allowing company to “transport the goods, chattels, armor, muni-
tion, and furniture, needful to be used by them, for . . . defense, or otherwise in 
respect of the said plantations” (spelling modernized)); Miller, supra note 12, at 
934 (“Historically, private collectives and early corporations possessed some abil-
ity to keep and bear arms.”). 
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“political.”183  Under English common law, a man could gather 
persons to defend his house, although if they ventured off the 
property on their own initiative they risked being charged with 
unlawful assembly or riot.184  Contemporary state constitu-
tional provisions that protected a right to keep and bear arms 
often spoke of it as necessary for protection of the self and the 
political community.185  For example, the 1780 Constitution of 
Massachusetts stated, “The people have a right to keep and to 
bear arms for the common defence”;186 the 1796 constitution of 
Tennessee used similar phrasing: “[F]reemen of this State have 
a right to keep and to bear arms for their common defence.”187 
In fact, as discussed in more detail below, community law en-
forcement was understood as a duty in an era without a profes-
sionalized force specifically designated to maintain order. 
The purpose of the right is not purely personal either.  Self-
defense may be the “central component” of the Second Amend-
ment, but that common law core does not preclude some kind 
of collective understanding for the right.  First, it bears repeat-
ing that self-defense alone is an inadequate operating theory of 
the Second Amendment.188  Self-defense is both too broad and 
too narrow.189  It is too broad because persons, like the men-
tally ill and felons, have moral and legal rights to self-defense, 
but they have no corresponding right to keep and bear arms, as 
Heller itself states.190  If the Second Amendment were co-exten-
183 Michael Steven Green, The Paradox of Auxiliary Rights: The Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 52 DUKE L.J. 113, 
166 (2002). 
184 Compare 1 WILLIAM  HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE  PLEAS OF THE  CROWN 516 
(John Curwood ed., 8th ed. 1824) (1716) (“[A]n assembly of a man’s friends in his 
own house, for the defence of the possession thereof . . . is indulged by law . . . .”), 
with Queen v. Soley (1707) 88 Eng. Rep. 935, 937; 11 Mod. 114, 116–17 (“Though 
a man may ride with arms, yet he cannot take two with him to defend himself, 
even though his life is threatened; for he is in the protection of the law, which is 
sufficient for his defence.”). 
185 See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 198–99, 205–07, 216 (2006) (compiling and characteriz-
ing state constitutional provisions). 
186 Id. at 208. 
187 Id. at 209. 
188 JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT: 
RIGHTS, REGULATION AND THE FUTURE OF Heller152–53 (2018); cf. Calderone v. City of 
Chicago, No. 18 C 7866, 2019 WL 4450496, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2019) (“The 
Court is unaware of any authority indicating that the Second Amendment is 
relevant to the question of under what circumstances violent action is legally 
justified as self-defense.”). 
189 BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 188, at 152–53. 
190 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008) (stating 
that prohibitions on firearms in the hands of felons and the mentally ill are 
presumptively constitutional). 
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sive with self-defense, this exclusion would make no sense. 
Self-defense is also too narrow, because self-defense at com-
mon law has traditionally been justified only where the violence 
was necessary, the harm was imminent, and the force propor-
tional to the threat.191  But the right to keep and bear arms 
does not neatly map onto these requirements.  One is entitled 
to possess a firearm (as distinct from using it) no matter how 
remote or innocuous the threat and no matter how dispropor-
tionate the force to that threat.192 
Self-defense is also inadequate because it’s not scalable. 
Self-defense covers individuals, yes, but it also covers groups, 
states,193 and nations.194  Further, any one of these entities 
can pose a threat to any of the others.195  It cannot be that the 
right is completely undifferentiated, either with respect to the 
nature of the self-defense claims of these different actors, or to 
the arms they can use to advance those claims.  It seems im-
plausible that precisely the same rules for self-defense apply 
whether we are speaking of an individual or a nation; and it 
certainly cannot be that the weapons effective to defend one are 
equally suitable for any of the others. Heller says as much, 
forbidding the private ownership of “dangerous and unusual 
weapons” (like land mines or guided missiles or armor piercing 
rounds) despite their undeniable utility for national self-de-
fense, and their arguable utility for private self-defense.196 
Even the “central component” of the Second Amendment— 
self-defense—is not nearly as personal as conventionally 
thought.197  To the extent Heller adopts an English common 
191 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
192 See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 188, at 152–54.  For a discussion of the 
relationship between Second Amendment doctrine and self-defense, see generally 
Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment, 108 
CALIF. L. REV. 63 (2020) (exploring challenges to self-defense as the “core” of the 
Second Amendment). 
193 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (stating that no state may “engage in War, unless 
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay”). 
194 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”). 
195 See David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 
1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1454 n.358 (“The Framers . . . saw community defense 
against a criminal government as simply one end of a continuum that began with 
personal defense against a lone criminal . . . .”). 
196 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
197 For a further elaboration of this point, see generally Darrell A. H. Miller, 
Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (2017) 
(noting how the state has a heavy role in shaping the right to self-defense) [herein-
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law baseline for the core of the right, rather than some transna-
tional or transcendent principle of natural law,198 that baseline 
historically has contained a public, collective component.  As 
the Supreme Court recognized, at English common law, all 
homicides for personal purposes were culpable acts. “[O]nly 
those homicides committed in the enforcement of justice were 
considered justifiable; all others were deemed unlawful and 
were punished by death.”199  The one exception was homicide 
in self-defense in the home, the so-called “castle doctrine.”200 
Homicide in public places, even to save one’s life, was not 
considered blameless.  As Lord Coke wrote, “[A]lthough a man 
kills another in his defence . . . without any intent, yet it is 
felony . . . for the great regard which the law has to a man’s 
life.”201  Those who killed in self-defense had to petition the 
sovereign for a pardon, and even then were subject to civil 
actions by the family of the deceased.202  Although pardons 
became routine by the time of Henry VIII,203 the distinctions 
between the two types of homicide remained in criminal law 
treatises well into the nineteenth century,204 and Parliament 
did not abolish the formal distinction between excusable homi-
cide in self-defense, and justifiable homicide in furtherance of 
law enforcement until 1828.205 
In contrast to purely personal self-defense, which only ex-
cused a homicide, a justified homicide required that the slayer 
after Miller, Self-Defense].  The next three paragraphs rely in part on this prior 
research. 
198 It is possible, of course, that Justice Scalia in Heller did not adopt a posi-
tive common law baseline discernable from history, but instead appealed to time-
less principles of natural law. Cf. Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 
124, 136 (D.D.C. 2016) (stating that because the Second Amendment codified a 
pre-existing right, the “first step in the historical inquiry is examining the right we 
inherited from English and natural law”).  But that understanding would run 
counter to Justice Scalia’s instincts in other areas of constitutional doctrine. See 
ANTONIN SCALIA, SCALIA SPEAKS: REFLECTIONS ON LAW, FAITH, AND LIFE WELL LIVED 248 
(Christopher J. Scalia & Edward Whelan eds., 2017) (“Do you really want judges— 
fallible judges—going about enforcing their vision of natural law, contrary to the 
dictates of democratically enacted positive law? Lord, no.”). 
199 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692 (1975). 
200 Semayne’s Case (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195; 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 91 b. 
201 Id. 
202 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 482 (2d ed. 1898). 
203 Killing a Thief Act of 1532, 24 Hen. 8, c. 5 (Eng.). 
204 See Claire O. Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 621, 637 (1996). 
205 See The Offences Against the Person Act of 1828, 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 10 
(providing that “no punishment or forfeiture shall be incurred by any person who 
shall kill another by misfortune, or in his own defence, or in any other manner 
without felony” (capitalization modernized)). 
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act on behalf of the sovereign, either directly or in the course of 
public law enforcement.206  Initially, these justifiable homicides 
were very few, and had features closer to the execution of a 
death sentence than self-preservation.207  But eventually justi-
fiable homicide expanded at common law to include killing to 
prevent forcible felonies including robbery, burglary, and ar-
son, and to prevent the escape of a felon.208  Moreover, these 
kinds of enforcement actions were described as a duty incum-
bent upon all law-abiding citizens.209  Although some eight-
eenth-century treatise writers recognized that self-preservation 
and the duty to enforce the law against felons could serve the 
same ends, the convergence was coincidental.210  Not until 
1806, in the case of Commonwealth v. Selfridge, did an Ameri-
can court “use the term ‘self defense’ to describe what up until 
that point in legal history [had been] characterized as a justifia-
ble prevention of felony.”211 
In other words, the history of Anglo-American self-defense 
law—the core of the right to keep and bear arms according to 
Heller—has traditionally maintained a conceptual distinction 
between excusable, but socially suspect homicides on behalf of 
the self, and justifiable homicides executed in maintenance of 
crime control and public order.212  Malcolm Thorburn has pro-
vided a crisp jurisprudential account of this history, stating 
that private citizens have such authority “only insofar as they 
are performing a public function . . . and accordingly, they are 
bound by similar normative constraints when deciding what 
206 Rollin M. Perkins, Self-Defense Re-Examined, 1 UCLA L. REV. 133, 142 
(1954); Benjamin Levin, Note, A Defensible Defense?: Reexamining Castle Doctrine 
Statutes, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 523, 528 (2010) (“The only justifiable homicide . . . 
was one committed under the auspices of the state, or at least in clear furtherance 
of the state’s interests.”). 
207 See generally Bernard Brown, Self-Defence in Homicide: From Strict Liabil-
ity to Complete Exculpation, 1958 CRIM. L. REV. 583 (tracing the history of self-
defense). 
208 Thomas A. Green, The Jury and the English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600, 
74 MICH. L. REV. 413, 436–48 (1976); see also Miller, supra note 197, at 92–93 
(discussing the distinction between justifiable homicide and excusable homicide). 
209 WM. L. CLARK, JR., HAND-BOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 137 (1894) (“It is not only 
every person’s right, but it is his legal duty, to prevent a felony, even if he has to go 
to the extreme of taking the life of the person attempting to commit it.”). 
210 MICHAEL FOSTER, CROWN CASES 274 (2d ed. 1791). 
211 Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II-Honest but Unreasonable 
Mistake of Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459, 477 (1987) (footnote omitted). 
212 Green, supra note 208, at 436–48; see also Miller, supra note 197, at 85 
(discussing the historical development of self-defense as a right in Anglo-Ameri-
can law). 
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conduct is justified as public officials would be in the same 
situation.”213 
Because self-defense simpliciter is doctrinally, function-
ally, and historically inadequate as the sole organizing princi-
ple for the Second Amendment, something more nuanced—like 
safety—is required to understand the right.214  That is, the 
right to keep and bear arms is a right for people to keep and 
carry arms for self-defense in such a manner and under such 
circumstances as they contribute to safety.215  This safety goal 
has both a personal and public aspect.216  A right to carry a 
firearm extends only so far as it contributes to personal safety; 
and the right aggregated over groups is justified only to the 
extent it advances safety of the public at large.217  Such a 
reconceptualization of the right to keep and bear arms would 
be more consonant with founding-era notions of individual 
rights, as Jud Campbell has documented.218  With the excep-
tion of certain kind of truly “inalienable rights”—like freedom of 
conscience—natural rights were about producing a common 
good.219  Nor is such a reconceptualization of the right around 
public goods alien to our administration of other kinds of con-
stitutional rights.  Speech is protected most robustly when it 
empowers political participation and when it contributes to the 
ability of a democratic society to govern itself.220  For this rea-
son, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the First Amend-
ment protects not only speakers, but speech itself, and that 
213 Malcolm Thorburn, Justifications, Powers, and Authority, 117 YALE L.J. 
1070, 1076 (2008). 
214 BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 188, at 154–59. 
215 Safety does not have to be the only rationale.  The right to keep and bear 
arms could also be about autonomy or tyranny prevention. See id. at 159–69. 
216 Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, 
Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 295, 352–54 (2016) (discussing the safety rationale for the Second 
Amendment). 
217 As one of us has written elsewhere, the Second Amendment may contem-
plate something like a “marketplace of violence” regarding the individual use of 
violence and threats of violence that leaves everyone better off. BLOCHER & MILLER, 
supra note 188, at 155–56.  Of course, there’s no reason to think that an unregu-
lated “marketplace of violence” is ideal, or that regulation has no place in prevent-
ing or resolving market failures. Id. 
218 Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 
CONST. COMMENT. 85, 86 (2017) (explaining that founding-era notions of natural 
rights were about “creat[ing] a representative government that best served the 
public good”). 
219 Id. at 112 (“Founding-Era natural rights were not really ‘rights’ at all, in the 
modern sense. They were the philosophical pillars of republican government.”). 
220 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) 
(“Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy . . . .”). 
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more generally the “Constitution often protects interests 
broader than those of the party seeking their vindication.”221 
Reconceptualizing the right to keep and bear arms as de-
signed to achieve safety would also address a frequent critique 
of American constitutional rights discourse—its excessive fo-
cus on individuals and its inattention to expressive or institu-
tional features of rights.222  Rights are often conceived of as 
trumps—the rights holder plays this one card and vanquishes 
all other utilitarian considerations.223  But as a number of 
scholars have observed, trumps are not the only way to con-
ceive of rights, and is an incomplete description of American 
constitutional practice.224  Instead, rights are often designed to 
counter certain kinds of illegitimate reasons the government 
offers for its rules.225  Rights protect individuals so that govern-
ments cannot eliminate the kind of public good the right is 
supposed to supply.  As Richard Pildes says: “An intended and 
justifying consequence of rights is that through protecting the 
interests of specific plaintiffs, rights also realize the interests of 
others, including the construction of a political culture with a 
specific kind of character.”226  In the context of arms, the impli-
cation is that an individual’s right to bear arms is protected to 
the extent it contributes to the public good of security.  And the 
political culture captured by the right to keep and bear arms is 
that it carries with it an attendant set of public responsibili-
ties.227  People authorized by law to carry arms and to threaten, 
or even execute, lethal force on others are doing so not only on 
their own behalf, but on behalf of the public as well. 
221 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). 
222 See generally Jamal Greene, Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28 
(2018) (criticizing the Supreme Court for focusing on absolute rights as opposed 
to balancing them with institutional concerns). 
223 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184–205 (1977). 
224 See generally Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Mean-
ings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL  STUD. 725 (1998) 
(criticizing rights being framed as trumps and advocating for framing rights as 
structural).  We take no position on whether Pildes characterizes Dworkin’s ac-
count correctly. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Pildes on Dworkin’s Theory of 
Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 301 (2000) (criticizing Pildes’s characterization of Dwor-
kin’s trumps). Our casual observation is that the “rights as trumps” approach in 
practice is not applied with the subtlety that Dworkin may have conceived it. 
225 Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American 
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998); see also Darrell A. H. Miller, 
Institutions and the Second Amendment, 66 DUKE L.J. 69, 87–91 (2016) (discuss-
ing how institutional analysis can inform reasons for firearm rights and 
regulation). 
226 Pildes, supra note 224, at 731. 
227 See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1107, 1116–17 (2011). 
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If the Second Amendment’s fundamental purpose is safety, 
rather than an undifferentiated notion of individual self-preser-
vation, then some kind of collective right to bear arms would 
seem to follow.  Individuals can certainly defend themselves, 
but associations magnify that ability.  As one of us has written 
elsewhere: 
Just as individuals can better exercise their First Amend-
ment rights by associating together, individuals can better 
exercise their Second Amendment rights by association.  Af-
ter all, a person shouting from a soapbox is far less effective 
at communicating than are ten thousand persons in a 
parade.  Similarly, a lone gunman is far less able to defend 
himself than is an armed gang.  Just as the right “peaceably 
to assemble” is an individual right that is exercised collec-
tively, one can imagine the Second Amendment right to keep 
and bear arms as an individual right that can be exercised 
collectively, albeit perhaps, in a more tightly circumscribed 
manner.228 
Assuming this is the correct framing for the right to keep 
and bear arms, one must necessarily modify the libertarian 
conception of the right.  The right to keep and bear arms is not 
an individual trump so much as a way of ensuring the produc-
tion of a certain kind of public good—safety.  Personal activities 
with firearms that do not contribute to safety either fall com-
pletely outside the scope of the right or are not protected by it; 
government regulations on the keeping and bearing of arms 
that frustrate that goal are unconstitutional; regulations that 
advance this public good are lawful. 
To rethink the Second Amendment along these lines is not 
to gainsay Heller or its core conclusion that the right is per-
sonal.  Nor does it require a National Guard to be the sole 
institution designated to administer the collective aspects of 
this public good.  But it does require attention to other kinds of 
institutions that, post-Heller, give content and meaning to the 
public aspects of the right to keep and bear arms, separate (if 
not independently) from individuals.  Other constitutional 
228 Miller, supra note 12, at 938–39 (footnotes omitted).  It is possible that no 
collective entity manages the public aspects of the right to keep and bear arms, 
and the Second Amendment contemplates a largely unregulated “marketplace of 
violence” where the market will effortlessly ensure an optimal distribution of “good 
guys with guns” to counter all the “bad guys with guns.” See BLOCHER & MILLER, 
supra note 188, at 155–57. But that proposition seems needlessly dystopian and 
is not warranted by the existing doctrine, see id., or supported by indisputable 
empirical evidence. Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, The Latest Misfires in Sup-
port of the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1374 
(2003). 
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rights, often thought of as being “personal,” are facilitated and 
shaped by institutions.  Churches, universities, political par-
ties, and schools all empower and constrain the First Amend-
ment.229  Rights in these domains are part of the “working 
Constitution” that Karl Llewellyn described as “in good part 
utterly extra-Documentary.”230  Rights conceived as working 
through institutions dissolves the convenient, but false, divi-
sion between constitutional rights and constitutional struc-
ture231 and alter what often appears a simple binary 
question—is there a right or not—into something more descrip-
tively accurate and analytically useful. 
In sum, nothing about the text, history, tradition, purpose, 
or nature of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms precludes a collective understanding of the right in addi-
tion to a personal one.  But, since Heller toppled the organized 
militia as the collective entity that administers this public or 
collective aspect of the right, the next task is to identify the 
kinds of collectives that now fill the breach.232 
B. The City as a Self-Defense Institution 
One institution that constrains and facilitates the collec-
tive aspects of bearing arms must be the city.  The city, among 
other things, is a self-defense institution.233  “[D]efense and 
security” have been, according to Matthew Waxman, “[a] driv-
ing force behind the evolution and development of cities.”234 
Cities as a political body far predate more sophisticated com-
munities like states or nations,235 and a chief motivation for 
their creation was safety. 
229 See generally PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 107–260 (2013) 
(providing examples of First Amendment institutions and discussing how they 
interact with the First Amendment); see also Frederick Schauer, Institutions as 
Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1757 (2007) (stating 
that “there are numerous areas of constitutional law in which institution-specific 
categories of doctrine might usefully play a larger role than they do now”). 
230 K. N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15 
(1934). 
231 Ozan O. Varol, Structural Rights, 105 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1030 (2017). 
232 For more on this point, see generally Miller, supra note 225, at 95–106 
(analyzing various institutions that facilitate and constrain the Second 
Amendment). 
233 JOEL KOTKIN, THE CITY: A GLOBAL HISTORY 11 (2005); LEWIS MUMFORD, THE 
CITY IN HISTORY 51 (1961). 
234 Matthew C. Waxman, Siegecraft and Surrender: The Law and Strategy of 
Cities as Targets, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 354 (1999). 
235 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 5  
(1911) (“Compact aggregations of people ante-date the formation of states or gen-
eral governments.”). 
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Neolithic humans constructed knots of dwellings, arranged 
in a circle, the better to defend themselves from raiders.236 
Eventually, these early communities found natural features— 
hills, rivers, cliffs—provided even better protection and what 
was a place of refuge in times of crisis became, over time, a 
destination for settlement.237  In the medieval age, walled cities 
replaced scattered and vulnerable villages.238  In fact, the abil-
ity to maintain its own security may have been one qualifica-
tion for municipal corporate status in England.239  Once these 
walls were built, to provide freedom from external threats, the 
walls could be used to “maintain freedom within.”240  Walled 
towns became the site for markets, for labor specialization, 
and, eventually for some measure of democratic participation 
and autonomy.241  Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations, re-
marked on how “[t]he inhabitants of cities . . . considered as 
single individuals, had no power to defend themselves; but by 
entering into a league of mutual defence with their neighbours, 
they were capable of making no contemptible resistance.”242 
These medieval cities had their own militias and came to enjoy 
a certain amount of autonomy and political representation. 
Max Weber, who famously described the state as the monopo-
list of legitimate violence,243 identified the urban community as 
a settlement possessing the following features: “(1) a fortifica-
tion; (2) a market; (3) a court of its own and at least partially 
autonomous law; (4) a related form of association; and (5) at 
least partial autonomy [administered by elected officials].”244 
In England, the King recognized these features in the City 
of London from as far back as the Norman Conquest.245  When 
William the Conqueror invaded England in 1066, he issued a 
charter to the City of London recognizing its ancient privileges 
236 See LUDWIG HILBERSEIMER, THE NATURE OF CITIES: ORIGIN, GROWTH, AND DE-
CLINE 18 (1955). 
237 Id. at 18, 20; see also Waxman, supra note 234, at 358 (“[C]ities provided 
defensive infrastructure” going back to the third century). 
238 MUMFORD, supra note 233, at 250. 
239 Id. at 251. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 251–52. 
242 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 355 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1991) (1776). 
243 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in THE VOCATION LECTURES 32, 33 (David 
Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone, trans., 2004) (“[T]he state is the 
form of human community that . . . lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate 
physical violence. . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
244 Max Weber, The Nature of the City, in CLASSIC ESSAYS ON THE CULTURE OF 
CITIES 23, 38 (Richard Sennett ed., 1969). 
245 See CHRISTOPHER N.L. BROOKE, LONDON 800–1216: THE SHAPING OF A CITY 29 
(1975). 
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and guaranteeing that all of the city’s “laws and customs be 
preserved as they were in King Edward’s day.”246  Among the 
customs honored by subsequent sovereigns was the right of the 
City to elect its own sheriff, aldermen and related ministers.247 
The aldermen of London were entrusted with “assuring that 
everyone in his ward had weapons and a horse for the purposes 
of defense.”248  These rights and privileges, as well as those of 
other cities and towns, were reaffirmed in Magna Carta by King 
John in 1215.249 
As cities became more populated, internal coordination is-
sues became more complicated.  Cities needed security forces 
to protect residents from the depredations of outsiders; but 
they also needed security to protect residents from their neigh-
bors.250  Before the rise of the professionalized police force 
around the nineteenth century, policing was a social obliga-
tion, pursued by members of the community.  The “King’s 
peace” had to be preserved and crimes against the peace were 
affronts to the sovereign.251  Maintaining the peace was the 
duty of certain ministers but was also enforced by the citizens 
themselves.  The 1181 Assize of Arms “provided that ‘all 
townsmen and all communes of free men’ were to bear certain 
kinds of arms—thereby making all citizens soldiers and all cit-
246 Id. 
247 A species of this persists in the concept of the “freedom of the city” requir-
ing military officials to be granted permission to parade in the city. See David 
Baxter, Local Military Honoured in Freedom of the City Ceremony, GLOBAL NEWS 
(Sept. 12, 2015, 8:07 PM) https://globalnews.ca/news/2217646/local-military-
honoured-in-freedom-of-the-city-ceremony/ [https://perma.cc/2Y9B-5GRC]. 
248 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND  REVOLUTION: THE  FORMATION OF THE  WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION 382 (1983). 
249 Magna Carta, cl. 13 (1215), reprinted in Magna Carta Translation, BRIT. 
LIBR., https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/magna-carta-1215 [https:// 
perma.cc/74DN-95UG] (last visited Nov. 15, 2020) (“The city of London shall enjoy 
all its ancient liberties and free customs, both by land and by water. We also will 
and grant that all other cities, boroughs, towns, and ports shall enjoy all their 
liberties and free customs.”). 
250 Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Order-Maintenance Agenda as Land Use Policy, 
24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 131, 132 (2010) (“While protecting inhabi-
tants from invading outsiders is no longer a primary function of cities, local 
governments must continue to guarantee their residents’ security by adopting 
and enforcing the rules necessary to protect them from deviant insiders.”); see 
also Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Exper-
iences and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L.J. 1631, 1637 
(2015) (“[A]s cities developed, dispute resolution was one of the basic functions of 
government; indeed, some argue the formation of cities in Medieval times 
stemmed from the need to deal with conflicts so as to facilitate commerce and 
provide a modicum of peace and security.”). 
251 Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1181, 1231 (2016). 
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ies military units.”252  Systems like the hue and cry empowered 
the citizens of the town to pursue malefactors and imposed a 
corresponding duty along with that power.253  An Ordinance of 
1195 ordered “all men to arrest outlaws, robbers, thieves and 
the harborers of such.”254  An edict in 1233 created a night-
watch and instructed them to “arrest those who enter[ed the] 
vills at night and go about armed.”255  The citizenry were 
obliged by law to equip themselves for such public service, 
depending on their means, and included such items as a 
“Hauberke [a Breastplate] of Iron, a Sword, a Knife, and a 
Horse.”256  And, indicated above, distinctions between excusa-
ble homicide in self-defense, and justifiable homicide in fur-
therance of law enforcement provided the legal features that 
distinguished purely private violence from public violence.257 
Even as a professional class of municipal defenders gradu-
ally developed between the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries,258 this notion of a public duty persisted.  In 1780, 
speaking on violence during the sectarian Gordon Riots, 
London’s principal lawyer described the “hybrid right/obliga-
tion”259 to bear arms like this: 
It seems, indeed, to be considered, by the ancient laws of this 
kingdom, not only a right, but as a duty; for all subjects of the 
realm, who are able to bear arms, are bound to be ready, at 
all times, to assist the sheriff, and other civil magistrates, in 
252 BERMAN, supra note 248, at 360 (footnotes omitted). 
253 David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1195–1200 
(1999); see also EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 116 (E. & R. Brooke 1797) (1644) (“[T]he duty of the constable is, to raise 
the power of the town, as well in the night as in the day, for the prosecution of the 
offender . . . .”) (spelling modernized); Donohue, supra note 251, at 1231 (“All 
persons between the ages of fifteen and sixty who heard the hue and cry were 
obliged to assist.”). 
254 Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 547 
(1924). 
255 Id. 
256 Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 164 N.E. 726, 727 (N.Y. 1928) (alteration in 
original) (citing POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 202, at 577; 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, 
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 294 (3d. ed. 1922)). 
257 See discussion supra notes 201–211 and accompanying text. 
258 Ira P. Robbins, Vilifying the Vigilante: A Narrowed Scope of Citizen’s Arrest, 
25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 557, 563–64 (2016) (“As population density in-
creased and greater urbanization took hold, the citizen’s arrest doctrine adapted 
to place less power in the hands of private citizens and more power in the hands of 
professional law enforcement.”). 
259 Saul Cornell, Limits on Armed Travel Under Anglo-American Law: Change 
and Continuity over the Constitutional Longue Durée, 1688–1868, in A RIGHT TO 
BEAR  ARMS?: THE  CONTESTED  ROLE OF  HISTORY IN  CONTEMPORARY  DEBATES ON THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT 72, 76 (Jennifer Tucker, Barton C. Hacker & Margaret Vining 
eds., 2019). 
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the execution of the laws and the preservation of the public 
peace.260 
This tradition of localized security travelled from the United 
Kingdom across the Atlantic.  Early towns and cities in America 
exercised significant autonomy in policing, typically adopting a 
constable and watchman system.261  City leaders designated 
these officials to keep the peace, and those officials in turn 
enlisted the aid of “onlookers or local residents” to make ar-
rests.262  Tocqueville remarked in the 1830s that on his tour of 
America he’d “seen the inhabitants of a county . . . forming 
committees with the object of catching the criminal and hand-
ing him over to the courts.”263  This is because everyone in the 
local community “thinks he has an interest in . . . arresting the 
guilty man.”264  In a tort suit in 1923 in New York, where a 
policeman instructed a cab driver to pursue a criminal, then-
New York Chief Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote: 
The duty goes back to the days of the hue and cry. ‘The main 
rule we think to be this,’ say the historians of our early law, 
‘that felons ought to be summarily arrested and put in gaol. 
All true men ought to take part in this work and are punisha-
ble if they neglect it.’265 
Increased demands on security generated all the problems 
associated with delegating authority for that benefit.  Volun-
teers to maintain security became scarce.  Watchmen would 
shirk.266  Unscrupulous private policing services—like “thief 
catchers”—collected bounties for thwarting crimes they con-
spired to commit.267  In America, private law enforcement took 
on an especially grotesque character.  Slave patrols, lynch 
mobs, and white supremacist organizations all claimed the 
mantle of community protectors and keepers of the peace: per-
sons acting—collectively—to pursue their natural right of self-
260 Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLIZARD, DESULTORY REFLECTIONS ON POLICE, WITH ESSAYS 
ON THE MEANS OF PREVENTING CRIMES AND AMENDING CRIMINALS 59–60 (1785)). 
261 JONATHAN  OBERT, THE  SIX-SHOOTER  STATE: PUBLIC AND  PRIVATE  VIOLENCE IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 52 (2018). 
262 Id. 
263 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 113, at 96. 
264 Id.  This may have been a rosy-colored view of the role of community law 
enforcement at the time. See RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTOR-
ICAL STUDIES IN AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM 23 (1975) (discussing how pri-
vate law enforcement sometimes lead to lawlessness and anarchy). 
265 Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 164 N.E. 726, 727 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C. 
J.) (internal citations omitted). 
266 Sklansky, supra note 250, at 1197–98. 
267 Id. at 1199. 
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defense.268  Pinkerton guards, hired as a private militia by plu-
tocrats, violently suppressed labor during the latter years of 
the nineteenth century.269 
Initially, especially in America, the police did not offer 
much more effective or more public minded service.270  Profes-
sionalization helped ameliorate some of these issues.  The move 
to professionalize law enforcement began in London in the early 
eighteenth century and picked up speed in the United States a 
generation later.  Specialization of law enforcement, as well as 
training and accountability methods, became hallmarks of a 
new model for policing.271  Training in weapons was of particu-
lar importance.  In 1919, New York City Police Commissioner 
Arthur Woods disparaged those jurisdictions that had ap-
pointed officers and “turned [them] out on the street . . . armed 
with loaded revolvers, and yet with no training in the care or 
use of the weapon.”272  The result was that “if an officer took a 
shot at anyone on the street, about the only safe individual 
within range of his gun was the criminal he was shooting 
at.”273 
The city’s privileged role in securing safety in the form of 
policing has been a flashpoint for federalism and localism dis-
putes for hundreds of years.  A driver for home rule protections 
for cities, for example, was state legislative attempts to transfer 
matters of local authority and concern to state entities.  One of 
the most notorious acts of state “ripper” legislation (as it was 
268 As former Confederate General John B. Gordon testified, the Klan “was 
simply this . . . an organization, a brotherhood of the property-holders, the peace-
able, law-abiding citizens of the State, for self-protection.” Affairs in Insurrection-
ary States: Hearing Before the J. Comm. to Inquire into the Condition of Affairs in 
the Late Insurrectionary States, 42d Cong. 308 (1871) (statement of John B. 
Gordon).  It was, he said, “a police organization to keep the peace.” Id. at 309. 
Klan defendants argued through counsel that they were simply exercising a natu-
ral right to “[b]and . . . together as a defense against any such threats as were 
apprehended.” PROCEEDINGS IN THE KU KLUX TRIALS AT COLUMBIA, S.C. IN THE UNITED 
STATES CIRCUIT  COURT, NOVEMBER TERM, 1871, at 425–26 (Benn Pitman & Louis 
Freeland Post eds., 1872); see also Saul Cornell & Justin Florence, The Right To 
Bear Arms in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment: Gun Rights or Gun Regula-
tion?, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1043, 1063 (2010) (discussing the Klan’s self-de-
fense argument  raised during the South Carolina Ku Klux Klan trials). 
269 See Sklansky, supra note 253, at 1213. 
270 Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems 
of Democracy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 615, 623–24. 
271 See generally Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2003–06 (2017) (overviewing the professionalization of 
police). 
272 ARTHUR WOODS, POLICEMAN AND PUBLIC 159 (1919), reprinted in 1 HARRY L. 
WILSON, GUN POLITICS IN  AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND MODERN DOCUMENTS IN  CONTEXT 
108–09 (2016). 
273 Id. 
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called) was New York State’s transfer of authority over munici-
pal law enforcement to state organs.274  The act provoked back-
lash so intense it led to rioting.275  The history of these home 
rule movements has to do with preserving local authority over 
what many regarded as a fundamentally local institution—the 
police department.  Municipal litigation over the scope of home 
rule authority has frequently involved questions over who is 
authorized to police the community, with the trend toward 
viewing “matters of police personnel . . . of basically local 
concern.”276 
The centrality of public security to local concerns is not 
just limited to home rule however. Printz v. United States, for 
example, a central case in the anti-commandeering canon, had 
to do with the requirement of a local sheriff’s office in Montana 
to enforce the Brady Handgun Act.277  The premise of the hold-
ing appears to be that “localities may decide whether to allow 
. . . participation [in federal law enforcement efforts] based on 
their own views of whether those enforcement efforts trans-
gress constitutional norms.”278  One of the most important 
cases in civil rights litigation, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 
addresses the constitutional limits of federal courts to address 
misconduct by local police departments through the exercise of 
equity jurisdiction.279 
To be sure, the Warren Court revolution in criminal proce-
dure280 and the rise of section 1983 as a federal check on local 
police power281 have been significant.  These kinds of changes 
have altered what was otherwise a wholly local phenomenon. 
274 Lyle Kossis, Note, Examining the Conflict Between Municipal Receivership 
and Local Autonomy, 98 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1126 (2012). 
275 Colin Gordon, Patchwork Metropolis: Fragmented Governance and Urban 
Decline in Greater St. Louis, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 51, 57 n.51 (2014). 
276 OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 6.4 (5th ed. 2019). 
277 521 U.S. 898, 904 (1997). 
278 Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism 
in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1289 (2004) (emphasis 
omitted). 
279 461 U.S. 95, 105–07 (1983); see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, 
Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1984) (“Even if Lyons’s standing were upheld, the Court ruled 
that principles of comity and deference to state law enforcement agencies would 
require dismissal under the doctrine of equitable restraint.”). 
280 See generally Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Re-
thinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1361 (2004) (outlining the major criminal procedure developments the 
Warren Court made). 
281 See generally, MICHAEL G. COLLINS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: IN A NUTSHELL 
§§ 1–14 (5th ed. 2016) (describing how the Court’s application of section 1983 
changed to provide a check on local governments and their agents). 
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That said, the police power, as it pertains literally to policing, 
has and remains a largely local enterprise.  Law enforcement 
today remains localized: the Department of Justice estimates 
there are over 15,300 “general purpose” state and local law 
enforcement agencies, of which more than 12,300 are munici-
pal government police.282  Crime prevention strategies also 
tend to be more efficient when made by local decision-making 
authorities.283  And this lends some context to how courts may 
address use of firearms for the provision of public safety. 
Given the longstanding tradition of deference to local deci-
sion making with respect to who and how the city arms its 
agents for public security, it is somewhat anomalous that when 
municipal governments attempt to regulate public firearms, 
some state legislatures have been aggressive to the point of 
punitive.  A supermajority of states preempt municipal regula-
tion on guns,284 with some states going so far as to threaten 
fines, removal from office, or personal civil liability for city lead-
ers who “enact[ ] or enforc[e]” local regulations on firearms.285 
Attention to the firearms rights of the city would restore some 
of the local expertise and local governance that these kinds of 
preemptive regulations disparage. 
In sum, the argument we have supplied is fairly simple to 
track: municipal corporations are not categorically prohibited 
from asserting constitutional rights; the Second Amendment 
right to keep and bear arms is not purely personal, but has a 
corporate, public component; the municipal corporation is an 
institution that historically, traditionally, and functionally em-
powers and constrains the constitutional right of collective 
282 Walker, supra note 270, at 619. 
283 See John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local 
Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 691 (1999) (“[N]othing about the local crime problem 
suggests that centralization of power in federal law enforcement can be more 
efficient than local organization of law enforcement.”); Robert C. Ellickson, Con-
trolling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-
Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1245 (1996) (noting need for flexibility); Wayne 
A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1409, 1419–20 (2001) (“That crime control should evolve in this self-consciously 
localized manner should come as no surprise, given that the human conse-
quences and articulated explanations of crime are largely local in nature, as are 
police enforcement  efforts.” (footnotes omitted)). 
284 Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
1995, 1999 (2018) (“As of 2013 . . . forty-five states preempted local firearms 
regulation.”). 
285 Id. at 2002–03; see also Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American 
Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1182 (2018) (discussing Arizona’s preemption statute 
which permits investigation of local laws and withholding funding to the local 
government if it remains out of compliance after thirty days) (citing ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 41-194.01 (2017)). 
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arms bearing for self-defense.  Hence municipal corporations 
should have some claim to Second Amendment rights in a 
post-Heller world. 
III 
THE CITY’S SECOND AMENDMENT 
We have addressed two major objections to the city as a 
bearer of Second Amendment rights.  First is that cities cannot 
assert constitutional rights, especially against the will of their 
incorporating states.  We explained how this notion rests on an 
account of municipal corporations that bears little resem-
blance to the sociological reality of the modern American city, is 
not uniformly applied as a matter of constitutional doctrine, 
and is normatively undesirable.  Second is that the right to 
keep and bear arms is purely personal and cannot be under-
stood in any collective or aggregate sense.  We showed that the 
Second Amendment retains, even post-Heller, a collective ele-
ment designed to further public safety.  We then showed how 
the city is situated traditionally and functionally as an institu-
tion organized to administer that collective right. 
In this last section, we sketch out the affirmative version of 
the city’s Second Amendment.  First, we supply a general 
framework for how cities may assert rights to keep and bear 
arms.  Then we apply that framework to some of the specific 
challenges of gun rights and policy we identified in the 
introduction. 
A. The Substantive Contours of the City’s Second 
Amendment 
1. Government Arms 
As a general matter, our argument means courts should 
recognize the unique arms-bearing interests of the city in litiga-
tion over the scope and protections of the Second Amend-
ment.286  This interest is more specific than a general concern 
with safety or an undifferentiated police power.  It is an interest 
in the city as an arms-bearing entity itself, and as an institu-
tion that manages collective arms bearing for public security. 
The city’s interests in rights in this collective sense is not 
unique to the bearing of arms.  Borrowing from the First 
286 Second Amendment issues, like First Amendment issues, and most other 
constitutional rights have coverage issues and scope issues.  The existing two-
part framework for Second Amendment cases tends to follow these two lines of 
analysis.  For more on this, see BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 188, at 102–14. 
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Amendment (as is frequently done in Second Amendment 
cases287), free speech litigation has wrought a doctrine to ad-
dress the government’s role as a speaker—the government 
speech doctrine.  This doctrine has two valences. One deter-
mines whether the speech should be attributed to the govern-
ment.288  Expression that is determined to emanate from the 
state is not subject to the typical requirement that the govern-
ment must be content—and viewpoint—neutral with respect to 
speech.289  Hence the federal government can express its views 
that cigarette smoking is deadly even though that is clearly a 
message with a strong critical perspective against some Ameri-
can citizens and industries.290  The second determines what 
limitations, if any, the Constitution imposes on that speech.291 
While the First Amendment’s Speech Clause may not limit the 
state from expressing its opinions, other constitutional clauses 
may.  When the government’s speech takes the form of prayer 
in public schools, for example, it may be barred as a violation of 
the Establishment Clause, at least where it is regarded as coer-
cive to nonbelievers.292 
287 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) (“Just as the First 
Amendment protects modern forms of communications . . . the Second Amend-
ment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms . . . .”) 
(citation omitted); id. at 595 (“[W]e do not read the Second Amendment to protect 
the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not 
read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any pur-
pose.”); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating 
that “for guidance in evaluating Second Amendment challenges” the First Amend-
ment right to speech “is the natural choice”). 
288 E.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542–43 (2001) (speech 
of lawyers working for state-funded Legal Services Corporation was constitution-
ally protected individual speech, not government speech); see generally HELEN 
NORTON, THE GOVERNMENT’S SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION 27–67 (2019) (exploring 
when speech of state actors and employees may be attributed to the government). 
289 See Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 
(2015) (“When the government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause 
from determining the content of what it says.”). The Court explained in Walker 
that when the government speaks, it is regarded as a participant in, rather than a 
regulator of, the marketplace of ideas. Id. at 2245–46. 
290 See NORTON, supra note 288, at 28 (discussing this and other examples of 
opinionated government expression). 
291 E.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198–99 (1991) (holding that speech of 
doctors in context of a government-funded health program was the speech of the 
government, and thus not subject to scrutiny as viewpoint-discriminatory). 
292 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) (holding that required 
prayer at a school graduation ceremony was coercive in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause where the school “compelled attendance and participation” in the 
ceremony); see generally also NORTON, supra note 288, at 68–92 (discussing gov-
ernment speech in tension with the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses). 
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Just as the local government can be situated as an actor 
who speaks for First Amendment purposes,293 so may it be 
situated as an actor who bears arms for Second Amendment 
purposes.  The question whether the government bears arms 
should prove easier than determining when the government 
speaks, largely because it is far more straightforward to deter-
mine when someone bears arms than when they are engaging 
in constitutionally protected expression.294  The government 
bears arms when it requires one of its agents to do so as part of 
the agent’s official duties.  So, a public-school security guard, 
whether paid or a volunteer, who carries a gun when on duty 
does so on behalf of the government. 
A government arms doctrine is akin to the government 
speech doctrine insofar as both need to identify when the state 
is engaging in conduct in its own right.  A government arms 
doctrine would be different, and more expansive, than the gov-
ernment speech doctrine, however, in how it casts the state as 
a rights bearer.  While the Speech Clause does not constrain 
the state when it speaks, neither does it offer constitutional 
protection (conventionally understood) to government 
speech.295  By contrast, the government arms doctrine as we 
define it would supply municipal governments with both a 
shield and a sword.296  The shield would be that just as the city 
293 In making this claim, we recognize how government speech as an exception 
to the First Amendment and government speech as a category of First Amendment 
speech is still being worked out. See Blank, supra note 143, at 439; see also City 
of El Cenizo v. State, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 776 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (local officials had 
First Amendment right not to be gagged in their speech as government officials by 
the state); Cty. of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (“A municipal corporation, like any corporation, is protected 
under the First Amendment in the same manner as an individual.”), aff’d, 907 
F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990).  Richard Briffault suggests the El Cenizo decision shows 
that “going beyond substantive preemption to penalize local expressive activity 
may trigger judicially enforceable free speech concerns.”  Briffault, supra note 
284, at 2011. But see EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 102 F.3d 869, 
871 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The Executive Branch of the federal government does not 
have rights under the first amendment . . . .”). 
294 Just about any act has some expressive overtone, requiring courts to ask 
hard questions about what counts as “speech.” Compare, e.g., S. Fla. Free 
Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 609 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding nude 
sunbathing not constitutionally protected speech), with, e.g., Barnes v. Glen The-
atre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991) (holding nude dancing constitutionally 
protected speech). 
295 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (holding 
that state action that can be viewed as government speech “is not subject to the 
Free Speech Clause”). 
296 In this way the government arms doctrine would go beyond the current 
government speech doctrine, which tends to regard the speech of a city as a shield 
against private suits, but only rarely as a sword against preemptive regulation by 
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can privilege its own viewpoint when it speaks, a city can privi-
lege its own arms and the arms of its agents over the arms of 
others.  The sword would be that the city, as a rights-bearing 
entity, can assert its own Second Amendment rights in cases 
where the state or federal government attempts to preempt its 
function as the coordinator of collective arms bearing and as 
the provider of public security with arms.297  That the city can 
wield that right as a sword, however, does not say how sharp it 
is.  The strong version of the city’s Second Amendment would 
negate contrary judgments by state or federal officials about 
arms bearing, for instance, within the jurisdictional limits of 
the city.  A weaker form would act as a weight to the city’s side, 
requiring federal or state authorities to offer additional justifi-
cations or proof why their policy choices about arms within 
municipal boundaries should prevail over the choices of the 
city.298 
Introducing such a government arms doctrine would 
change how judges think about the Second Amendment in 
many cases involving cities and states.  The typical framing in 
these cases pits an individual who wishes to carry some 
weapon against a state or local ordinance forbidding it.  Con-
ceiving of the city as a rights-bearing entity, and not just as a 
regulator, changes the dynamic.  No longer is the conflict just 
an individual rights holder versus a government restraint; it is 
now a conflict between two rights holders. 
2. The City as Collective Security Decision Maker 
The second and related implication of this analysis is that 
the city, as the institution best situated to make decisions 
about its collective armed security, would enjoy deference to its 
choices.  The analogy is to a private firm that merits some 
deference with respect to how it manages its internal security 
the state. But see Blank, supra note 143, at 373–75 (arguing for a more proactive 
right of municipal government). 
297 In this manner, our proposed model departs from an undifferentiated gov-
ernment speech model, which allows the city to speak, but does not clearly pre-
vent the city from being gagged. See id. at 429 (“[O]nce we look more closely at 
local entities, courts are much more ambivalent, even sympathetic, to the idea of 
recognizing local entities as First Amendment speakers.”). 
298 Either the strong or weak form could be related to Shawn Fields’s descrip-
tion of a subfederal anticommandeering doctrine. See Fields, supra note 5, at 487 
(“[A] more nuanced subfederal anticommandeering principle may reside in the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of localities as independent entities when the inter-
pretation of a constitutional right requires local tailoring.”). 
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operations.299  Thus far, few courts have expressly articulated 
a corporate Second Amendment right;300 but, assuming such a 
right, it seems that the private decision of which agent to em-
power to provide security is a core feature of this kind of corpo-
rate claim to Second Amendment rights. 
If this corporate actor believes that the best security plan is 
to designate two security guards armed with semiautomatic 
pistols, then this decision should prevail over the individual 
who wishes to carry an AR-15 onto corporate property.  Indeed, 
the security guards, exercising the Second Amendment rights 
of the private company, would have a coordinate authority to 
disarm such a person, on the ground that the rifle wielding 
individual is not an authorized agent.301  Private Second 
Amendment rights would thus contain both a positive compo-
nent (the right to have two armed security guards on site) and a 
negative one (the right not to have others interfere with this 
plan).302 
By the same token, at least in public places or areas con-
trolled by the city, in the strong version of this model, the city’s 
decisions about collective security should prevail over asser-
tions of Second Amendment rights to the contrary.  Consider, 
for example, the Houston Public Library.  An individual who 
wanted to carry a gun into the library could argue that she was 
entitled to do so, due to Texas’s relaxed gun laws, which allow 
concealed carry holders to carry their weapons into many pub-
lic buildings, including libraries.303  On our theory, though, 
299 Cf. Second Amendment Arms v. City of Chicago, 135 F. Supp. 3d 743, 761 
(N.D. Ill. 2015) (assuming private firearm businesses can claim Second Amend-
ment rights). 
300 But see id. (“Defendants have not presented the Court with any persuasive 
authority as to why Second Amendment protections should not extend to 
businesses.”). 
301 Cf. United States v. Richards, 937 F.2d 1287, 1292 (7th Cir. 1991) (disarm-
ing others is a manifestation of self-defense); State v. Smith, 150 S.E.2d 194, 198 
(N.C. 1966) (“[I]f one disarms another in self-defense with no intent to steal his 
weapon, he is not guilty of robbery.”); Moran v. Martinson, 146 N.W. 841, 842 
(Iowa 1914) (judging instructions correct to state that man had right to disarm 
woman with revolver in self-defense). 
302 Note that this justification is different than just a general power to exclude 
under property law. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1264 
(11th Cir. 2012) (discussing Second Amendment law written on a “background” of 
common law that permits individuals to exclude others from their property). The 
implication is that “parking lot” laws and other kinds of “forced entry” regulations 
impact the Second Amendment rights of corporate entities. See Miller, supra note 
12, at 907. 
303 FAQ: Handguns in Texas Libraries, TEX. ST. LIBR. & ARCHIVES COMMISSION, 
https://www.tsl.texas.gov/ld/pubs/opencarry.html [https://perma.cc/FKT5-
EWXY] (last visited Nov. 15, 2020). 
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Houston is the constitutionally appropriate decision maker on 
the collective security of the library and its patrons.  So, if the 
city asserted that it wanted only its armed guards to carry 
weapons in the library, we argue that that assertion should 
prevail over individuals’ claims to the contrary, whether rooted 
in state law or the federal Constitution.304 
3. Limits 
Situating the city as a bearer of collective firearm rights 
introduces a number of difficult issues into the conversation 
about the Second Amendment.  Perhaps the hardest of these is 
how to negotiate the conflicts between the city’s collective right 
to promote safety, its decisional priority on that issue, and 
individual rights, including personal rights to bear arms for 
self-defense. 
When these come into conflict, the answer cannot simply 
be that the city’s prerogative as the final decision maker on 
collective security with guns prevails over all individual rights. 
For example, we do not think a Second Amendment right of a 
city means that it can discriminate on the basis of race or 
gender when it licenses persons to carry firearms.  Nor do we 
think that a city’s Second Amendment interest in public secur-
ity sweeps away all the limits of Fourth Amendment excessive 
force or reasonable search jurisprudence. 
More difficult is how to think about how the city’s Second 
Amendment claims interact with an individual right to keep 
and bear arms for personal self-defense.  One way to mediate 
this conflict is through the division of physical space.  On the 
one hand, the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense has 
always been at its apogee in the home.305  A city’s Second 
Amendment choices do not necessarily prevail when it comes 
to regulations concerning firearms there.306  Another is the no-
tion of “sensitive places” identified in the Heller opinion.307 
There could be a sliding scale of priority of municipal interest in 
protecting “sensitive places.”  They may include schools and 
304 There may be other constitutional issues as well, such as free speech rights 
and the institutional posture of the library as a site of free expression, but that is a 
matter of other scholarship. See Darrell A. H. Miller, Constitutional Conflict and 
Sensitive Places, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 459, 485 (2019). 
305 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (describing the 
home as “where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute”). 
306 See, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound 
Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1299–1301 (2009) (discussing 
restrictions that could apply to the Second Amendment). 
307 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
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government buildings, but also public property where the city’s 
duty and right to provide collective security, such as streets or 
parks, are at its greatest.  Again, the instinct is the city has 
more than just a “proprietary” interest in those spaces; it has 
an arms for self-defense interest in these places as well.  Hybrid 
public/private spaces, such as government-funded entities like 
city-run day care, medical clinics, or government housing pre-
sent harder cases. 
Nor do we think the city’s right to determine its own collec-
tive security necessarily allows municipalities to coerce individ-
uals into firearm ownership or to carry firearms against their 
will.  One might imagine that a city, particularly a sparsely 
populated one where police response was necessarily limited, 
might argue that an armed citizenry would prevent crime by 
enabling citizens to supplement public order with their own 
self-defensive conduct.308  This is not as fanciful an example as 
it may seem.  At the dawn of the American republic, many cities 
required certain categories of residents to own guns (subject, 
though, to strict regulations in terms of use and storage).309 
And the city of Kennesaw, Georgia, passed an ordinance re-
quiring that “every head of household residing in the city limits 
is required to maintain a firearm.”310  Here too, the individual 
right to bear arms (or more accurately, the right not to bear 
arms311) would overbear any municipal right rooted in the Sec-
ond Amendment.  In the same sense that we argue the Second 
Amendment gives cities the prerogative to make public deci-
sions about collective security, so would it give individuals the 
right to make private decisions about their own individual 
safety, and if they felt that carrying a firearm on their person or 
having one in their home was not in their interest, the city’s 
concern for public safety cannot countermand that choice. 
308 One county in financial distress essentially told all its residents to arm 
themselves.  Associated Press, “Lock Your Doors, Load Your Gun,” Kentucky Sher-
iff Warns in Stopping Law Enforcement, ABC15 (Feb. 12, 2019, 6:32 PM), https:// 
www.abc15.com/national/lock-your-doors-load-your-gun-kentucky-sheriff-
warns-in-stopping-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/N2T5-BDHB]. 
309 E.g., An Act for Regulating of the Militia, ch. 3, §§ 1, 5, 1694 Mass. Acts 
128; An Act for the Regulating, Training and Arraying of the Militia, ch. 21, § 11, 
1778 N.J. Laws 45. 
310 Omar Jimenez, In This American Town, Guns Are Required by Law, CNN 
(Mar. 7, 2018 2:22 PM) (internal quotation marks omitted), https:// 
www.cnn.com/2018/03/06/us/kennesaw-georgia-gun-ownership/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/7GBL-AUDX]. 
311 See Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 
6 (2012). 
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Finally, the city could not simply invoke the Second 
Amendment any time that it sought to regulate firearms, and 
then claim that its status as the ultimate decision maker on 
these issues concluded the matter.  Rather, the city’s right to 
keep and bear arms would apply only where it makes plausible, 
good faith attempts to organize collective security. Just as with 
other constitutional doctrines, courts could review city claims 
to bear arms under some degree of scrutiny.312  At the very 
least, if the city’s defense of some firearm-related action or 
regulation under the Second Amendment was not reasonably 
related to its interest in advancing public safety, its assertion of 
the right would fail. 
B. The Theory in Practice 
1. Concealed Carry Licensing 
An obvious application of the government arms doctrine 
would be in the area of concealed carry licensing.  Today, no 
state in the union categorically prohibits a person from ever 
carrying a firearm out of their homes.  Instead, the major un-
resolved issue in Second Amendment jurisprudence is the con-
stitutionality of “shall-issue” versus “may-issue” regimes for 
carrying firearms.  Fifteen states require no license to carry a 
firearm at all; approximately thirteen “shall-issue” states re-
quire a license, but do not permit any discretion on the part of 
the licensing official if the applicant meets certain minimum 
requirements (typically related to firearm prohibitors such as a 
felony conviction); another fourteen “shall issue” states provide 
limited discretion; and eight states have “may issue” licensing 
laws that require the applicant to demonstrate good cause.313 
Some states require training on when and how to use firearms; 
half of the states don’t require any training at all.314 
Treating the city as a Second Amendment rights bearer 
would transform the way law regards regulation of concealed 
carry.  A person carrying a firearm publicly, even if not using it, 
is not acting on only behalf of himself alone but is carrying for 
312 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791–803 (1989) (outlining 
a test for the constitutionality of time, place, or manner speech regulations); see 
also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87–89 (1949) (regulating sound trucks based 
on reasonable time, place, and manner regulation on speech). 
313 See Concealed Carry, GIFFORDS L. CTR. (Nov. 8, 2019), https:// 
lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/concealed-carry/ 
[https://perma.cc/8KKN-573H]. 
314 Mascia, supra note 9 (“Just 24 states and the District of Columbia include 
mandatory range time as part of their permitting process, while the remaining 26 
have no such requirement in place.”). 
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the protection of himself and others.  Individual concealed 
carry significantly affects collective security, so that the city 
clearly has an interest in who is providing this public benefit. 
The strongest version of a government arms claims would 
mean the city could refuse to permit any person to publicly 
carry firearms except for the city’s own designated agents.  This 
may seem draconian, but it is similar conceptually to a corpo-
ration banning weapons possession in its headquarters on the 
theory that it alone can determine the deployment of arms in 
the interest of its internal security.  A middle position may 
allow individuals to carry weapons, but not of the same lethal-
ity as those of the designated security agents.  This outcome 
would allow individuals some ability to engage in self-defense 
and defense of others but would preclude local authorities from 
being outgunned as they were during the 2017 Charlottesville 
riot.315  These are only two ways to mediate between the city’s 
and individuals’ gun rights.  Regardless of how this line is 
drawn, the city should not be constitutionally cut out of the 
process of deciding who will be its guardians, how those guard-
ians will be trained, and what weapons they will use to produce 
this public good.316 
2. Police Officers Versus the City 
Several members of the Seattle Police Department recently 
sued the City of Seattle on the theory that the city’s revised use 
of force policy violated their individual Second Amendment 
rights.317  The plaintiffs argued that the policy, which pre-
vented them from using their firearms unless such use was 
“objectively reasonable,” unconstitutionally constrained their 
315 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Hurt and Angry, Charlottesville Tries to Regroup from 
Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/ 
us/charlottesville-protests-white-nationalists.html [https://perma.cc/6R4A-
HH7Q].  Governor McAuliffe observed that the protestors “had better equipment 
than [s]tate [p]olice had.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
316 Cf. Concealed Carry State by State, GIFFORDS L. CTR. (Nov. 8. 2019), https:/ 
/lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/state-law/50-state-summaries/concealed-
carry-state-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/8KKN-573H] (noting that until Decem-
ber 1, 2015, Michigan’s handgun permitting scheme required authorities to notify 
any “city, village, or township that has a police department . . . to determine if it 
has any information relevant to the applicant’s eligibility under state law to re-
ceive a license to carry a concealed handgun.”). 
317 See Olivia Beavers, Appeals Court Rules Against Seattle Cops Who Sued 
Over Use of Force Policy, HILL (Sept. 19, 2017, 4:11 PM), https://thehill.com/ 
blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/351401-appeals-court-rules-against-seattle-
cops-who-sued-over-use-of [https://perma.cc/95XK-D4GN]. 
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ability to use their firearms for self-defense.318  The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the claim on the 
theory that the use of force policy survived intermediate scru-
tiny and did not violate the officers’ Second Amendment 
rights.319 
Missing from this opinion was any notion that Seattle also 
had Second Amendment interests that should enter into the 
analysis.320  Our framework would invite those considerations, 
and would likely yield a strikingly different analytical ap-
proach, albeit one that ultimately reached the same outcome. 
Here, the police were not seeking to use force on their own 
behalf, but rather in their roles as agents and employees of 
Seattle.  So just as law regards government employees who 
issue statements in the scope of their employment as engaging 
in government, rather than individual, speech,321 here the po-
lice should be regarded as bearing arms on behalf of the Seat-
tle.  This move alone would change the posture of the case. 
Instead of engaging in an analysis of whether the use of force 
rules restricted the police officers’ individual Second Amend-
ment rights, the government arms doctrine would highlight 
that the police’s use of arms in their work as peace officers does 
not constitute an exercise of individual rights in the first in-
stance.322  So because the plaintiffs would not bear any Second 
Amendment rights under a government-arms approach, the 
court’s substantive analysis would be unnecessary. 
3. Teachers with Guns 
The school shootings that have afflicted America in recent 
years323 have divided policy makers.  One reaction is to have 
318 Mahoney v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
319 Id. at 883. 
320 The lower court adopted what may be thought of as a kind of government 
arms theory at step one of the Second Amendment analysis, stating the claim did 
not even raise a Second Amendment question because the use of force regulation 
“represents an effort by an employer, the Seattle Police Department, to regulate 
the use not only of (employer-issued) weapons but of the force its employees are 
specially sanctioned to wield on behalf of the city government.” Mahoney v. Holder, 
62 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1222 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (emphasis added), aff’d sub nom. 
Mahoney v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2017). 
321 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“We hold that when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are 
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution 
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”). 
322 See Mahoney v. Holder, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1222 (W.D. Wash. 2014). 
323 See Elizabeth Wolfe & Christina Walker, In 46 Weeks This Year, There Have 
Been 45 School Shootings, CNN (Nov. 19, 2019, 4:13 AM), https://www.cnn.com/ 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-3\CRN303.txt unknown Seq: 62 25-MAR-21 9:56
R
R
738 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106:677 
more guns in schools, including arming teachers.324  The other 
is to limit guns in schools, including preventing teachers from 
bringing arms into the classroom.  Madison County, Ohio epit-
omizes the first response; in April of 2018 the school board 
voted overwhelmingly to arm teachers.325  The State of New 
York epitomizes the second; in July 2019, Governor Andrew 
Cuomo signed legislation barring local school districts from 
arming teachers.326  The guns in school issue raises two possi-
ble iterations of the city’s Second Amendment.327 
First, consider a municipal school district that passed an 
ordinance similar to the New York state law, preventing individ-
ual teachers from bearing arms within public schools because 
it believes that this will make schools safer.  This example is 
similar to the previous one: A municipal entity is dictating how 
its employees may bear arms in an attempt to enhance internal 
security.  The example is different, though, in other respects.  A 
municipal police department is typically the primary method by 
which a city organizes arms bearing for internal security. 
School boards have not traditionally served that function, 
though schools are another public place where security is espe-
cially desirable.  Bearing arms on behalf of the city and in the 
city’s interest is a core function of police; it is not (at least has 
not historically been) a core duty of teachers in the scope of 
their employment.  Finally, the municipal entity here is differ-
ent: in the Seattle case the city itself we imagine asserting a 
Second Amendment right; here, it is a school district. 
For all those reasons, this is a harder case.  As in Mahoney, 
the teachers whose firearm use is regulated are municipal em-
ployees, and the regulation affects them only in the scope of 
their employment.  One could thus argue that the government 






324 Matt Richmond, With No National Standards, Policies for Arming Teachers 
Are Often Left to Local School Districts, NPR (Apr. 2, 2019), https://wamu.org/ 
story/19/04/02/with-no-national-standards-policies-for-arming-teachers-are-
often-left-to-local-school-districts/ [https://perma.cc/N3C4-8DDX]. 
325 Breaking News Staff, Madison Local Schools Board Votes to Allow Arming of 
Teachers, Staff, WHIO TV7 (Apr. 25, 2018, 11:19 AM), https://www.whio.com/ 
news/local/madison-local-schools-board-votes-allow-arming-teachers-staff/ 
jBDB39Y97Ml3jrGcaxvTEN/ [https://perma.cc/T6EK-HUPD]. 
326 Gold, supra note 7. 
327 The issue of arming teachers also raises significant First Amendment is-
sues which we do not address here. See Miller, supra note 304, at 470–72. 
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which a municipality is acting to advance the cause of its citi-
zens’ safety, which would amount to a core exercise of the city’s 
Second Amendment as we have outlined it.  So, one could sim-
ply assert that the teachers have no individual right to keep 
and bear arms in this case; their arms-bearing on-the-job con-
duct is subsumed by and an extension of the municipality’s 
Second Amendment rights.  On the other hand, one could ar-
gue that schoolteachers are not police, and since they are not 
traditionally charged with peacekeeping functions, the pre-
sumption of regulating in a constitutionally empowered space 
is not as strong. 
This is likely a distinction without a difference.  For one 
thing, the aim of the school district’s policy is directly related to 
safety and in particular to reduce firearm-related violence. 
Moreover, the Court highlighted in Heller that in certain “sensi-
tive places”—including “schools and government buildings”— 
individual Second Amendment rights needed to give way to 
states’ and cities’ interest in peacekeeping and safety.328  Nor 
should it matter that the state actor here is a school district 
rather than the city itself; the fact that the district has dele-
gated responsibility over education matters (including safety) 
does not change the interests at play or the constitutional-
rights calculus.  On the contrary, the Court’s shadow doctrine 
respecting rights seems to extend to other kinds of municipal 
subdivisions as well as cities.  So long as the subdivision has a 
separate corporate identity, whether it is a general municipal 
government or a special purpose government should not 
matter. 
Consider a second valence of this issue: What if a state 
passed a law like New York’s that prevented school districts 
from arming teachers and a gun-friendly county argued that 
the state law infringed its Second Amendment rights?  Here, 
the problem is not possible tension between city and individual 
rights to keep and bear arms, but rather the conflict between 
firearm decision making between states and municipalities, 
and how the Second Amendment mediates such conflicts. 
Here, the county could resist the state law on a pair of 
theories.  One theory would be that the county has authority to 
decide for itself the best method of securing schools.  While the 
above discussion suggests that local assertions of authority 
over firearm regulation in schools predominates over the per-
sonal firearm interests of municipal employees, the same may 
328 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
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not be true for state laws regulating municipal employees.  Cit-
ies and counties could argue that they have longstanding his-
torical authority to regulate public safety, and that in their 
discretion they prefer to have individual teachers bear arms in 
school because they regard it as a safety-enhancing practice. 
We do not think a collective Second Amendment justifica-
tion for this kind of decision necessarily allows the local gov-
ernment to immunize armed teachers from liability for 
constitutional torts, any more than self-defense claims by po-
lice officers immunize them from Fourth Amendment suits.329 
Nor do we think this analysis relieves the local government of 
the constitutional obligation to adequately train armed teach-
ers on the limits of lethal force.  The archetypical “failure to 
train case” after all, is to empower government agents to em-
ploy deadly weapons and not to train them on their use.330 
However, even with these limitations, the implication of a local 
government’s authority to enforce its own constitutional rights 
to keep and bear arms—even in the face of contrary state pri-
orities—is that local governments can experiment with firearm 
deregulation as much as regulation. 
4. Second Amendment Sanctuaries 
Next, consider Second Amendment sanctuaries.  These are 
counties and cities that have passed legislative resolutions de-
claring that they will not enforce certain laws that they deem 
violative of the right to keep and bear arms.331  The resolutions 
protest a variety of measures ranging from background checks 
to laws enabling authorities to temporarily take weapons from 
dangerous or unstable persons.  The effect of these declara-
tions is hard to monitor.  To the extent that city officials imple-
ment the resolutions, that means only that they refuse to 
enforce the law—a negative proposition that can be difficult to 
identify or quantify.  Perhaps notably, as of yet there has not 
329 Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[W]hatever the 
circumstances prompting law enforcement officers to use force, whether it be self-
defense, defense of another or resistance to arrest, where, as here, a fourth 
amendment violation is alleged, the inquiry remains whether the force applied 
was reasonable.”); Richardson v. McGriff, 762 A.2d 48, 90 (Md. 2000) (Harrell, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Unlike the purely objective standard 
[for use of force] required by [the Fourth Amendment] the self-defense doctrine 
contains both subjective and objective elements.”). 
330 See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396 (1989). 
331 See Kelly Mena, Virginia Counties Move to Become ‘Second Amendment 
Sanctuaries’, CNN (Dec. 6, 2019, 6:14 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/06/ 
politics/virginia-counties-second-amendment/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
FF2H-X9WX]. 
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been an incident where a citizen sought enforcement of gun 
regulation and found local officials to be actively non-
compliant. 
Imagine, though, that the failure of a municipal official to 
take action led to litigation.  For example: California requires 
firearm dealers to perform background checks before issuing 
weapons to purchasers.  The City of Needles is a California 
desert town just west of the Arizona border that recently de-
clared itself a Second Amendment sanctuary.332  Suppose that 
firearms dealers in Needles began issuing weapons without 
performing background checks, and that city officials did not 
enforce this violation of state law.  If the State of California sued 
the City of Needles for an injunction requiring them to enforce 
the background-check law, could Needles invoke the Second 
Amendment to resist the injunction? 
The answer to this question may depend on how courts 
conceptualized Needles’ status as a constitutional actor.  If it 
argued that it was declining to enforce the state law because it 
believed that the law violated its residents’ rights to keep and 
bear arms, it would not raise the question whether the city qua 
city bore those rights because it would be acting on behalf of 
residents in some derivative fashion.  Asserting itself as an ag-
gregation of its residents’ individual Second Amendment liber-
ties avoids the hard question whether the city itself bears those 
rights, but here too it runs headlong into other objections.  If 
Needles prevailed on the argument that the state law violated 
the individual right to keep and bear arms, that would generate 
a general holding that would invalidate the law statewide. 
Some scholars have argued that the breadth of such an out-
come would be concerning because, as in this example, a mi-
nority of California’s 482 cities that passed a Second 
Amendment sanctuary resolution would replace and restrain 
the judgment of the remaining localities.  David Barron, for 
example, has argued against city policymaking that binds all 
other localities to follow the same course because it removes 
the decision-making discretion of the other cities.333 
Alternatively, Needles could defend nonenforcement of the 
background-check law on the theory that the California law 
332 Glionna, supra note 5. 
333 David J. Barron, supra note 139, at 2222 (“When a city’s constitutional 
claim . . . would not expand local policymaking discretion but instead bind every 
locality to follow a single course, then its interpretive independence from the state 
should be, as Justice Jackson wrote in a related context, ‘at its lowest ebb.’ . . . 
Cities have no sufficient interest in pressing these constitutional claims . . . and 
thus generally should be barred from doing so.”). 
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violates the city’s own Second Amendment rights.  Here, the 
claim would presume that the city—apart from its aggregated 
members—may assert such rights and would invoke the collec-
tive component of the right to keep and bear arms.  One aspect 
of this assertion is the institutional point that cities, not states, 
should serve as the primary lawmakers with respect to firearm 
policy because of their historic authority over and expertise in 
managing public safety.334  That said, though, Needles would 
have to prove that their nonenforcement of the law advances its 
public safety decisions in some meaningful way.  Here, the sub-
stantive argument is much harder to make than, say, in the 
case of guns in schools where there is at least a colorable 
argument that the regulation enhances school safety.  What 
public-safety objective would noncompliance with background 
checks further?  Needles could argue, for example, that its un-
derfunded police department would benefit from having citi-
zens engaging in self-defense and defense of others, so that 
having guns more freely circulating in the community would 
further public safety.  But this argument seems to recommend 
rather than detract from the benefits of background checks.  If 
a city wants to recruit private citizens into the service of inter-
nal security, it will presumably want and need to know that the 
citizens who are armed are responsible and competent gun 
owners and screen out dangerous and unstable individuals. 
This example illustrates that conceptualizing the right to keep 
and bear arms as one borne by cities would not necessarily give 
cities carte blanche to turn themselves into libertarian gun-
regulation-free zones but would be disciplined by the principles 
that animate the collective component of the Second Amend-
ment in the first instance. 
5. The Law Enforcement Officer Safety Act 
Thus far we have cabined our analysis to instances where 
state weapons regulations come into conflict with city poli-
cymaking.  Before concluding, though, we touch briefly on how 
the city’s Second Amendment rights would fare when they 
come into conflict with federal law.  A 2004 law, the Law En-
forcement Officer Safety Act335 (LEOSA) furnishes an opportu-
nity to explore this issue.  LEOSA allows qualified current law 
334 See Fields, supra note 5, at 488 (“While a statewide gun-control measure 
might not violate the Second Amendment per se, its application to a particular 
municipality might do so because it fails to be sufficiently tailored to the locality’s 
needs.”). 
335 18 U.S.C. § 926C (2018). 
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and retired law enforcement officers to carry concealed fire-
arms in any jurisdiction of the United States, regardless of 
state or local laws. 
Our claim is that the Second Amendment confers on cities 
the right to regulate their own collective security.  While LEOSA 
does not restrict a city’s right to hire peace officers or make 
certain firearms available to citizens, it does dilute a city’s abil-
ity to select the particular arms bearers that will promote its 
collective security.  To be sure, a city may welcome LEOSA as a 
means of providing additional trained law enforcement officers 
within its boundaries to supplement its collective security.  But 
to the extent that a city may not want individuals other than its 
selected police force responsible for its security, LEOSA over-
rides cities’ freedom to make this choice.  LEOSA’s derogation 
of cities’ Second Amendment prerogatives is particularly pro-
nounced because the law effectively requires cities to accept 
the decisions of other jurisdictions about who is allowed to bear 
arms in its jurisdiction regardless of the city’s own standards 
or judgment with respect to who counts as a qualified law 
enforcement officer.  To the extent that LEOSA forces cities 
(and states) to accept the federal government’s judgment about 
who is qualified to bear arms within their jurisdiction, the law 
may also run afoul of the Tenth Amendment’s anti-comman-
deering principle.336 
Our argument that a federal law could fail to pass constitu-
tional muster as against a city’s policy to the contrary will seem 
surprising at first glance.  After all, the Supremacy Clause 
guarantees that federal laws prevail over conflicting state regu-
lations, and Courts have extended the reach of the Clause to 
local laws as well.  Yet if we are to take the city’s Second 
Amendment seriously, rooted as it is in the empirical claim that 
cities are best situated to determine the shape of their internal 
security policies, then LEOSA has to give way to the city’s con-
stitutional right. 
CONCLUSION 
How courts address the constitutional rights of private cor-
porations and the constitutional rights of municipal corpora-
tions diverged long ago.  The possibility that this divergence will 
continue with regard to one of the most consequential set of 
questions—who should be empowered by constitutional right 
336 See Burban v. City of Neptune Beach, 920 F.3d 1274, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 
2019) (rejecting a construction of LEOSA that would “raise serious anticom-
mandeering concerns”). 
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to threaten and deploy lethal force—should cause us to rethink 
the entire manner in which we conceive of local governments 
and their place in our constitutional structure. 
This Article is an effort to begin that discussion.  The mu-
nicipal corporation is an institution that for historical and 
functional reasons has managed the collective aspects of the 
Second Amendment.  And yet, it suffers from the lack of any 
consistent or reasoned placement within our constitutional or-
der.  In a post-Heller era, when the militia has been weakened, 
if not entirely eliminated, from our right to keep and bear arms 
jurisprudence, we should think more deliberately about what 
public institutions facilitate and constrain this most public of 
issues.  The city is a good place to start. 
